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I. Introduction
Privately held conservation servitudes in gross' challenge the wis-
dom and creativity of courts and legislatures because they present a diffi-
cult choice among conflicting social values. Although authorization of
private conservation servitudes in gross reinforces freedom of contract,
promotes the benefits of private initiative, and assists conservation of the
natural environment, other important social policies suffer. Over the
past decade numerous legislatures, apparently failing to recognize this
tension, have approved privately held conservation servitudes in gross.
This Article describes the conflict and suggests paths to its resolution.
A. Description of Private Conservation Servitudes in Gross
Although conservation servitudes vary significantly in their terms
depending on the specific conservation purposes intended, some general-
izations are possible. Essentially, a conservation servitude is a negative
restriction on land prohibiting the landowner from acting in a way that
would alter the existing natural, open, scenic, or ecological condition of
the land.2 Typical provisions included in conservation servitudes range
1. Throughout this Article "private" and "privately held" refer to ownership by a nongovern-
mental, nonprofit association, corporation, or trust. Servitudes other than conservation servitudes
are referred to herein as "general servitudes."
2. See SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
WORKSHOP ON PUBLIC LAND ACQUISITION AND ALTERNATIVES 450 (Comm. Print 1981) (state-
ment of Michael Priesnitz) [hereinafter cited as WORKSHOP]; S. REP. No. 1007, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
10-11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6736, 6745-48 (defining "conservation
purpose"); U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, THE FEDERAL DRIVE TO ACQUIRE PRIVATE LANDS
SHOULD BE REASSESSED 12-17 (CED 80-14, 1979) [hereinafter cited as PRIVATE LANDS]; National
Park Service of the U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Revised Land Acquisition Policy, 44 Fed. Reg.
24,790, 24,797 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Acquisition Policy]; R. BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE AP-
PROACHES TO THE PRESERVATION OF OPEN LAND vii-ix (1967); PROTECTING NATURE'S ESTATE:
TECHNIQUES FOR SAVING LAND 54 (E. Stover ed. 1975); W. WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR
URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 7 (Urban Land Institute, Technical Bulletin No.
36, 1959); Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the Highway Beautification Program, 45 DEN. L.J. 168,
170-74 (1968); Higgins, Easements for Wild and Scenic Rivers, 70 J. FORESTRY 744 (1972); Mary-
land Environmental Trust, Conservation Easements 5 (1979) (copy on file with the Texas Law Re-
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from a prohibition against destruction of trees, shrubs, or other greenery
to a restriction to residential or existing uses. 3 Conservation servitudes
typically do not permit the holder to have physical use of or general ac-
cess to the burdened parcel,4 but allow inspection of the land to deter-
mine compliance with the restrictions.5  In short, a conservation
servitude seeks to preserve the environmental status quo of the burdened
land by shifting some ownership rights from the owner of the servient
tract to the servitude holder.
There is confusion over the appropriate label for these conservation
interests and over the nature of the property rights conferred. Common
names include: conservation easements, restrictions, rights, and futures;
open-space easements and less-than-fee interests; scenic easements and
interests; and development rights.
6
More important than appropriate labels is the question of which
body of law should govern. Traditionally, the law of real covenants (en-
forced either as covenants-at-law or as equitable servitudes) has been
seen as distinct from that of easements. 7 Courts have viewed easements
as valuable and protected property rights, while treating real covenants
with suspicion and subjecting them to greater barriers against enforce-
ment.8 Consequently, choosing the "easement" label for a conservation
interest and following the classical rules could lead an uncritical deci-
sionmaker to a quick and rigid result without the necessary policy
analysis.
Such shortcuts should be resisted for two principal reasons. First,
assuming there is validity to the traditional dichotomy between real cove-
view); The Nature Conservancy, Conservation Easements 2 (1976) (copy on file with Texas Law
Review).
3. For examples of conservation servitudes, see W. WHYTE, supra note 2, at 44, 60 (creating a
scenic easement); Cunningham, supra note 2, at 201 (prohibiting excavation and building structures
or roads, outdoor advertising, removal or destruction of trees and restricting land to residential or
existing uses); The Nature Conservancy, supra note 2, at 11 (prohibiting excavation and building
structures or roads, removal or destruction of trees, interference with water areas, motor vehicles,
accumulation of trash and unsightly materials, acts detrimental to water or soil conservation or fish
and wildlife preservation, and limiting varieties of new plantings); New Jersey Conservation Founda-
tion, Tax and Estate Planning: Land Preservation 24 (1981) (prohibiting excavation and building
structures or roads, removal or destruction of trees, accumulation of trash and unsightly materials,
and acts detrimental to water and soil conservation or fish and wildlife preservation) (copy on file
with Texas Law Review).
4. See, eg., R. BRENNEMAN, supra note 2, at 100 (expressly denying right of public access).
5. See, eg., Maryland Environmental Trust, supra note 2, at 20-21; The Nature Conservancy,
supra note 2, at 11.
6. See Netherton, Environmental Conservation and Historic Preservation Through Recorded
Land-Use Agreements, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 540, 567-80 (1979) (listing names for conser-
vation interests).
7. The Restatement of Property distinguishes easements from real covenants. RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY §§ 450-511, 530-568 (1944).




nants and easements, conservation servitudes more closely resemble real
covenants than easements and hence should not be labeled and treated as
easements.9 Although conservation servitudes are negative restrictions,
they do not resemble any of the four traditional types of negative ease-
ments.10 Like real covenants, conservation servitudes are "promises re-
specting the use of land."'"
Second, shortcut decisions that rely on mere labeling fail to address
inherent policy conflicts. This failure is underscored by recent scholar-
ship pointing out similarities between real covenants and easements, crit-
icizing their divergent rules of law, and calling for their unification into a
single law of servitudes.12 This Article, therefore, will examine not only
traditional real covenant and easement law, but also policy concerns.
For clarity, conservation interests are referred to as conservation "servi-
tudes," a neutral term that avoids the traditional categories.
Private conservation servitudes in gross can be validated by statute
or by judicial decision. At least thirty-seven jurisdictions have enacted
statutes expressly' 3 or impliedly 14 recognizing the validity of conserva-
9. See Krasnowiecki & Paul, The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 179, 194 (1961) ("ITihe type of interest needed to accomplish open-space preservation is
so unlike any easement and so like most restrictive covenants that one can expect the courts to treat
them as covenants.").
10. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 452 comment a (1944); 3 R. POWELL, REAL PROP-
ERTY 405 (1984); Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preervation of Urban
Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REv. 574, 613 & n.144 (1972).
11. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 522-568 (1944).
12. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
13. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1201 to -1206 (Supp. 1983) (recognizing private and governmental
power to create conservation easements); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6950-6954 (West 1980) (government
may obtain fee or any lesser interest in open space); id. §§ 7000-7002 (government may acquire
highway scenic easements); id §§ 51070-51097 (West 1983) (government may obtain open space
easements); id. §§ 51230-51239 (government may establish agricultural preserves); COLO. REv.
STAT. §§ 38-30.5-101 to -110 (1982) (governmental and private right to create conservation ease-
ments); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-131b to -131d (1972 & Supp. 1984) (government may acquire open
space easements); id. §§ 47-42a to -42c (1978) (governmental and private power to acquire and
enforce conservation restrictions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6811-6815 (1983 & Supp. 1984) (gov-
ernmental and private conservation easements); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06 (West Supp. 1983) (rec-
ognizing private and governmental conservation easements); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-10-1 to -5
(1982) (establishing right to create governmental and private conservation easements); Conservation
Rights in Real Property Act §§ 1-6, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 401-406 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983)
(recognizing governmental and private conservation rights); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-4-5.5-1 to .5-4
(Burns 1973) (recognizing governmental conservation easements); IOWA CODE §§ 11 1D.1-.5 (1984)
(governmental power to acquire conservation easements); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 1252 (West
Supp. 1985) (creation of governmental or private real property rights); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§§ 667-668 (1978) (defining conservation restrictions and granting governments the right of acquisi-
tion); id tit. 38, § 955 (Supp. 1982) (government may acquire and administer conservation restric-
tions); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-118 (1981) (creation of governmental or private
conservation easements); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-33 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984)
(creation of governmental and private conservation restrictions); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 399.251-.257 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.1816(51)-.1816(57) (Callaghan
1984)) (permitting creation of governmental and private conservation easements); MiNN. STAT.
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tion servitudes. There is little uniformity in either substance or style
among these statutes, 15 but one can generalize about their effect to some
extent. Twenty-five of the jurlsdictions that validate conservation servi-
tudes expressly provide for ownership of' conservation servitudes by pri-
vate nonprofit or eharitable corporations, trusts, or associations.1 6 Of
§§ 84.64-.65 (1982) (defining governmental and private conservation restrictions and providing for
enforcement); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76,6-201 to -211 (1983) (governmental and private conserva-
tion easements); N.H. REV. STAT. ANNq. -§§ 477:45-:47 (1983) (governmental and private conserva-
tion restrictions are real property int~rpts); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:8B-1 to -9 (West Supp. 1983)
(creation of governmental and private 'conservation restrictions); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§§ 49-0301 to -0311 (McKinney 1984--&'Supp, 1984-1985),(authorizing governmental and private
conservation edsetents); N.Y. GEN. MuiN. L w § 247 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1984-1985) (pro-
viding for governrmental open space easements); N.C. GEt4. STAT. § 113A-90 (1978) (government
may acquire scenic easements within right-,f, way boundary); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.67-
.70 (Page 1981) (grants of goverpmental qno private conservation easements); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 271.710-.750 (1983) (creation of govetnrmental anq private conservation and scenic easements);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5001-5013 (Purdon Supp. 1983) (acquisition and preservation of govern-
mental easements for open space); JR.I- GEN. LAWS §§ 34-39-1 to -5 (Supp. -1983) (granting legal
status to governmental and private conservation restrictiqns); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-9-10 to -30
(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1983) (authorizing transfers of governmental and private conservation
restrictions and.easements) id. § 51-i7,80, (creating governmental and private open space ease-
ments); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-13-101 to -111 (1982) (acquisition of governmental scenic river
easements); id. §§ 11-15-102 to -108 (acquisition of governmental scenic and open space easements);
id. §§ 66-9-301 to -309 (acquisition of private and governmental conservation easements); TEX. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. §§ 183.0Q1-.005 (Vernon Supp. 1983) (authorization of governmental conservation
easements); VA. CODE §§ 10-151 to -158 (1978 & Supp. 1984) (acquisition of governmental open
space interests); WASH. REV. CQDE § 64.04.130 (Supp. 1985) (authority to acquire governmental
and private open space interests); id. §§ 84.34.200-.250 (authority to use public money to acquire
conservationeasements); Wis. SrAT. ANN. § 61.34(3m) (West Supp. 1984-1985) (acquisition of gov-
ernmental conservation easements); id." § 7M).40 (authority to create governmental and private con-
servation easemens); see also infrq note M" (discussing the Uniform Conservation Easement Act).
14. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-464 to -464.01, 11-935.01 (1977) (authorizing expenditure of
public funds-for governmental acquisitWon of interests or rights in real property in open space lands
or open areas); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 65-40-.48Q.(1980) (authorizing local legislative bodies to obtain
scenic easements); Miss. CODE ANN. §§49-5-140 to -157 (Supp. 1983) (creating wildlife heritage
committee to acquire WntereM ixr.jiatur~l, #4es);, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 67.870-.910 (1978) (allowing
governmental ari private Qonservation easen.ents); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6303 (1973) (govern-
mental right to acquire easements); W. VA. CoDE § 20-1-7(11) (Supp. 1984) (governmental right to
acquire interests in land). .istorical restrictions are similar in some respects to conservation ease-
ments, but lie outside the scope.of this Article. See, eg., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-16
(1979).
15. But see UNIF. CoNsRveTION EASER4ENT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 51 (Supp. 1984). The Uniform
Act was approved by the National Coaference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1981.
Two jurisdictions have adopted t1Je Undorn Act, subject to modifications. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-
1201 to -1206 (Supp. 1983); Wi , STAT. A x ' 700.40 (West Supp. 1983). The Uniform Act ex-
presses a deliberate choice to "waximiyel. the freedom of the creators of the transaction to impose
restrictions on-the use of lan.d,'" UNiF. (OVSERYATION EASEMENT ACT Commissioners' prefatory
note, 12 U.L.A. 51, 51 (Supp. 1984), to uphold a conservation servitude as a "consensual arrange-
ment freed from common law impediments," a4., and to advance the values implicit in the "norm"
that allows conveyance of fee or nonpossrssory interests by private associations unless there is a
conflict with constitutional or statutory requirements, id. at 52. As will be argued here, such a
preference is at the cost of other societal values.
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1201(2)(ii) (Supp. 1983); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51075(d), (f) (West
1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-104(2) (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-42b (1978); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6811-6815 (1983 & Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06(3) (West Supp. 1983);
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-4 (1982); Conservation Rights in Real Property Act § 2, ILL. ANN. STAT.
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these, twenty-three expressly permit these interests to be held in gross.17
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act 8 represents a movement to
pass such statutory authorization in other jurisdictions.
Although no case to date has authorized a private conservation ser-
vitude in gross, 19 various commentators have urged common-law recog-
nition.20 Judicial validation presumably would recognize the conflicting
ch. 30, § 402 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 1252(A) (West Supp. 1985);
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-118 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West Supp.
1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 399.253 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 15.1816(53) (Callaghan 1984)); MINN. STAT. § 84.64 (1982); Mo. REV. STAT. § 67.890 (1978);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-204 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:46 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-8B-3 (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0305(3) (McKinney Supp. 1984-
1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.69 (Page 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 271.715(2) (1983); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-39-3 (Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-9-20 (Law. Co-op. 1981); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 66-9-305 (1982); VA. CODE § 10-158 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 64.04.130,
84.34.220 (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.40(1)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1983); see also Ky. REV.
STAT. § 65.470 (1980) (right to enforce governmental servitude is vested in any resident if govern-
ment fails to enforce); UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(2), 12 U.L.A. 51, 53 (Supp.
1984). The remainder of the statutes listed supra notes 13 & 14 authorize governmental servitudes
only.
17. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1204(1) (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-104
(1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-42b (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6812 (1983 & Supp. 1984);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06(4) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-4 (1982); Conservation
Rights in Real Property Act § l(b), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 401(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 1252(B) (West Supp. 1983); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-118(c)
(1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 399.254 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.1816(54) (Callaghan 1984)); MINN.
STAT. § 84.65 (1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-210 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:46
(1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8B-4 (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-
0305(5)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.70 (Page 1981); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 34-39-3 (Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-9-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 66-9-306 (1982); VA. CODE § 10-158 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.04.130 (Supp.
1983); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 700.40(4)(a) (West Supp. 1983); see also UNIF. CONSERVATION EASE-
MENT ACT § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 51, 56 (Supp. 1984).
An in gross real covenant or easement does not benefit a dominant parcel, but is held by the
servitude owner without reference to land owned by him. See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 9.32 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
18. 12 U.L.A. 51 (Supp. 1984); see supra note 15.
19. Cases have been reported involving governmental conservation servitudes. See, eg., North
Dakota v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1095, 1104-07 (1983) (preemption of state statutes that interfere
with federal government's ability to acquire wetland easements); United States v. Albrecht, 364 F.
Supp. 1349, 1351 (D.N.D. 1973) (enforceability of federal waterfowl easement), aff'd, 496 F.2d 906
(8th Cir. 1974); Santa Catalina Conservancy v. City of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 3d 221, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 708 (1982) (tax assessment of land subject to conservation servitude); Coons v. Carstensen, 15
Mass. App. Ct. 431, 446 N.E.2d 114, 115-16 (1983) (governmental conservation servitude encum-
bered title); Knowles v. Codex Corp., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 493, 499, 426 N.E.2d 734, 737-38 (1981)
(standing to enforce governmental conservation servitude); Sierra Club v. Palisades Interstate Park
Comm'n, 114 Misc. 2d 52, 450 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (challenge to modification of govern-
mental conservation servitude); Appeal of Pfirrmann, 63 Pa. Cmmw. 407, 437 A.2d 1336, 1337-38
(1981) (tax assessment of land subject to conservation servitude); Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d
256, 265-66, 142 N.W.2d 793, 797-98 (1966) (state can constitutionally condemn scenic easements).
20. E.g., R. BRENNEMAN, supra note 2, at 20-35, 50-64; A. DUNHAM, PRESERVATION OF
OPEN SPACE AREAS: A STUDY OF THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ROLE 15-27 (1966); Netherton,
supra note 6, at 553-56, 565-66.
A court could be required to decide the common-law validity of a private conservation servitude
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policies of freedom of contract and free alienability of land, a conflict
that inheres in all decisions about ties on land.
Private conservation servitudes in gross, as described by proponents
and authorized by legislatures, differ significantly from general servi-
tudes in at least three ways. First, in gross ownership of real covenants
traditionally has been prohibited,21 yet conservation servitudes can be
created in gross.22 Thus, conservation servitudes in gross do not limit the
veto right to ties over neighboring properties; they extend to a potentially
infinite amount of land.23 Second, advocates propose a perpetual life for
conservation servitudes, in stark contrast to traditional fears about ties
on land of unlimited duration.24 Finally, traditional common-law doc-
trines of judicial supervision of servitudes by their own terms do not ap-
ply to private conservation servitudes in gross, nor do existing
conservation statutes provide adequate means for dealing with potential
problems. 25
B. The Shape of the Problem
As currently conceived, privately held conservation servitudes in
gross allow a private party a perpetual veto over a potentially unlimited
amount of land held in fee by others. This result serves the critical goal
of conserving the environment and encourages private associations to
act. Yet permitting such servitudes frustrates other societal values.
First, the policy against dead hand ties on land, a policy that allows liv-
ing land owners to shift land use according to current market choices, is
hampered. Further, the difficult choices between development and pres-
ervation historically have been reserved to the community through the
in gross in several circumstances: if the jurisdiction has enacted no conservation servitude statute at
all or passed a statute authorizing only governmental conservation servitudes, if the interest in ques-
tion was created before the enactment of a conservation servitude statute, or if the statutory system
allows the creation of common-law interests. See, eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1205(d) (Supp. 1983)
(statute does not render interests outside statute unenforceable); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06(6) (West
Supp. 1983) (no implication that restrictions not within statute are unenforceable); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 668 (1978) (statute does not render interests outside statute unenforceable); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West Supp. 1983) (same); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 477:46 (1983)
(same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.70 (1982) (same).
21. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note 17.
23. Some claim that a small tract of land could be used as a dominant parcel to avoid claims
that the servitude was in gross. See R. BRENNEMAN, supra note 2, at 32; A. DUNHAM, supra note
20, at 17-18, 22; Shaman, Fending Off Development--Forever, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1981, § 8, at 4,
col. 2 (discussing an attempt to alter a government owned conservation servitude to allow the devel-
opment of a resort hotel). Such efforts should be scrutinized carefully, and "sham" appurtenant
servitudes should be treated as in gross interests. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 illustra-
tion 4 (1944).
24. See infra subpart IV(B).




democratic process of public land use controls; individual veto power
over community decisions through private covenants has been limited to
ties among neighbors. Allowing private, nonrepresentative organizations
the veto power implicit in conservation servitudes in gross threatens such
values. Finally, flexibility in both public and private land use controls is
critical; perpetual conservation restrictions that lack adequate means for
modifications mandated by public policy run counter to this goal. Con-
flicts among these policies will ripen with an increase in private conserva-
tion servitudes in gross 26 and with the transfer of properties subject to
such servitudes to new owners unsympathetic to the goal of freezing
property conditions.
27
Although it may be difficult today to imagine a more important land
use priority than conservation, a number of cases and events indicate that
other uses sometimes may be more critical than conservation. It is not
entirely clear, for example, that preservation of land is and always will be
preferable to its use as a hospital or church providing services to the
community, 28 a lower income housing project, a condominium contain-
ing recreational facilities and natural settings for its residents, 29 a public
recreation area for picnicking, swimming, and sports,30 or a commercial
or industrial area providing jobs for an economically depressed region.
3 1
The choice of the best current use of a parcel of land is difficult enough;
26. There is an "absence of a comprehensive data base" for conservation servitudes. See S.
REP. No. 1007, supra note 2, at 15, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6751. For
examples of conservation servitudes, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LAND
ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT PRACTIcES 9-10 (CED 81-135, 1981) [hereinafter cited as FED-
ERAL LAND ACQUIsITION]; Coughlin & Plaut, Less-Than-Fee Acquisition for the Preservation of
Open Space: Does It Work?, 44 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 452, 457 (1978); Comment, Conservation
Restrictions: A Survey, 8 CONN. L. REv. 383, 383-85 (1976); Ecology Drive Stirs Fear of Tax Losses,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983, § 8, at 10, col. 1; Shaman, supra note 23, at 1, col. 1.
This Article does not intend to imply that private groups currently holding conservation servi-
tudes act in the manner criticized here; rather, this Article focuses on potential problems.
27. For indications that enforcement problems may arise with second-generation owners of the
servient property, see United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974); Appeal of Pfirrmann,
63 Pa. Commw. 407, 437 A.2d 1336, 1337 (1981); National Park Service of the U.S. Department of
the Interior, Scenic Easements 12, 16 (1974) (copy on file with the Texas Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Scenic Easements]; Cunningham, supra note 2, at 182.
28. See, e.g., Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 172 N.E.
455 (1930); Rick v. West of the Ascension, 34 Misc. 2d 1002, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
29. See Shaman, supra note 23.
30. For illustration of the debate on how the public is best served by recreational and park land,
see Carmody, A Preservationist Group Enters Long Battle of Morningside Park N.Y. Times, Mar. 2,
1983, at BI, col. 1 (dispute between group seeking preservation of park as it was designed in 1887
and neighborhood organizations trying to renovate the park and increase facilities); Panel Approves
Partial Removal of a Park Grove, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1982, at B4, col. 1 (debate over removal of a
grove of trees planted as a memorial).
31. See Oregon Land-Use Plan Is Challenged, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1982, at A18, col. 1
(describing debate over relaxation of strict environmental land use planning of the 1970s to meet the
economic recession of the 1980s).
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more difficult still is the decision today regarding future use, because
future needs are more speculative. Rigid choices today may defeat the
right of future generations to make critical decisions affecting their lives.
This Article proposes a model for conservation servitudes that sup-
ports conservation but also accommodates the traditional public interest
policies in real property law. Two questions are involved: Should pri-
vate conservation servitudes in gross be recognized as valid and enforcea-
ble interests? If so, what controls, if any, should be put on such interests
in order to accommodate important societal goals?
Part II examines the factors favoring the use of private conservation
servitudes in gross, including conservation and the possible economic ad-
vantages of servitude as opposed to fee ownership and private as opposed
to public ownership. Part III explores the conflict between contract and
free alienability, focusing on how free alienability may be accommodated
with the values favoring private servitudes in gross. Part IV analyzes
servitude cases that turn upon in gross ownership and duration of inter-
ests. That analysis serves two purposes: to discover the current judicial
rules and to determine how courts have handled the policy issues inher-
ent in the contract/alienability dichotomy. Part V examines various
techniques available for terminating servitudes. Finally, Part VI pro-
poses three legislative and two judicial approaches to the problems
presented by private conservation servitudes in gross.
II. Factors Favoring Private Conservation Servitudes
A. Conservation of the Natural Environment
One hardly needs to document the increased public concern over the
natural environment and the growing commitment to conservation.
32
The nineteenth century American precept that maximum exploitation of
resources is not only most beneficial to society but also inevitable has
been rejected by many.33 There is also a growing realization that the
supply of unexploited land is limited and that once land has been devel-
oped it is difficult, if not impossible, to restore it to its natural condi-
32. See, e.g., Kruse, Development and Environment, 17 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 676 (1974) (describing
environmentalism as a social movement); Public Attitudes on Conservation, NAT'L FOOD REV.,
Spring 1980, at 28 (reporting results of USDA survey of Americans' attitudes towards conservation);
Public Lands: A New Dimension for Wilderness, OUR PUB. LANDS, Fall 1977, at 11 (discussing
change in Americans' views towards wilderness and describing federal conservation efforts).
33. See, e.g., R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 238-71 (3d ed. 1983) (dis-
cussed infra note 123); Madden, Land as a Natural Resource, in THE GOOD EARTH OF AMERICA 6,
6-18 (C. Harris ed. 1974); THE USE OF LAND: A CmZEN'S POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH




tion.34 Coupled with this is a belief that access to areas of natural,
undeveloped land benefits society by preventing the estrangement of peo-
ple from nature. 35 Open space is valuable even without physical access
by the public, because people can gaze at it or merely appreciate its exist-
ence.36 Both urban and nonurban areas thus are improved by preserving
land in its natural state.37 Conservation servitudes address these con-
cerns by allowing restrictions on alteration of natural land without trans-
ferring possessory or access rights.
B. Limitations on the Public Purse: Economic Benefits
Another factor that appears to favor conservation servitudes held by
private organizations is their economic impact. Private servitudes are an
economically sound alternative to governmental purchase of fee interests
for conservation purposes because servitudes cost less than fee titles and
because private purchases do not deplete the public purse.
1. Cost Advantages of Servitudes over Fees. -Purchases of fee inter-
ests for conservation purposes involve three costs: escalating acquisition
costs of real estate, indirect costs, and management expenses. Indirect
costs include lost productivity of private lands taken for public use and
lost tax revenues. Conservation servitudes appear preferable to fee inter-
ests with regard to these three costs, but because available data on the
costs of conservation servitudes are limited, the economic advantages can
be questioned.
(a) Acquisition expense. -The cost of both urban and rural real
estate has risen significantly, especially in areas under development-
precisely the areas with the greatest need for open space and conserva-
34. See Cooper & Vlasin, Ecological Concepts and Applications to Planning, in ENVIRONMENT:
A NEW FOCUS FOR LAND-USE PLANNING 183, 203 (D. McAllister ed. 1977).
35. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 247 historical note (McKinney 1974); S. REP. No. 1007,
supra note 2, at 9-10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6744-45; R. BRENNEMAN,
supra note 2, at vii-viii.
36. See Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, § 401, 84 Stat. 1770, 1781 (formerly codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1500(d) (1982) (omitted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982) (terminating authority
to make grants under the Act)) (congressional purpose to prevent "urban blight and deterioration"
by increasing open-space land); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51084(b)(1) (West 1983) (legislative declara-
tion of value of open space to neighboring urbanized areas or to maintain rural character); N.Y.
GEN. MUN. LAW § 247 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1984-1985); S. REr. No. 1007, supra note 2, at 11,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6746; WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 4 (statement
of Sen. Malcolm Wallop); W. WHYTE, supra note 2, at 7 ("Open space is not the absence of some-
thing harmful; it is a public benefit in its own right. ... ); id at 8, 16-20.
37. See Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1982) (nonurban); Act of
Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, § 401, 84 Stat. 1770, 1781 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1500(d) (1982) (omitted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982) (terminating authority to make
grants under the Act)) (urban); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51084(b)(1) (West 1983) (urban and rural).
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tion and hence the targets of governmental and private conservation ef-
forts.38 Although federal expenditures for land acquisitions have greatly
increased over the past twenty years, the purchasing power of the federal
government has not.39 Moreover, the amount of private land the federal
government can acquire for conservation purposes is limited.4° The most
optimistic estimates suggest that future funding will be inadequate for
projected state and federal land acquisitions. 41 Conservation servitudes
seem to provide government and private associations with a cost-efficient
alternative to fee acquisition; available data indicate that payments for a
conservation servitude generally range from fifteen percent to ninety per-
cent of the cost of fee title. Moreover, in certain cases no compensation
at all is paid.42
Two questions arise, however, about whether conservation servi-
tudes are truly cost effective. First, some cases demonstrate that the cost
savings of servitude acquisition over fee purchase are sometimes slight.43
It is not clear how many servitudes sell for ninety percent of fee value
and how many for fifteen percent, nor what the actual total dollar sav-
ings are. Second, in some cases it may be more efficient to buy the com-
plete ownership rights than to pay ninety percent of the fee title price for
the limited rights of a conservation servitude. This may be true espe-
cially with governmental purchases because government has other land
use goals besides preservation-for example, providing recreation-
which can be achieved only by fee acquisition.
(b) Indirect costs.-When the government purchases a fee in-
terest in private land for public use, society bears not only the nominal
38. See PRIVATE LANDS, supra note 2, at 10; Coughlin & Plaut, supra note 26, at 452.
39. See PRIVATE LANDS, supra note 2, at 10.
40. See North Dakota v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1095, 1097-98 (1983); WORKSHOP, supra
note 2, at 3 (comments of Sen. Malcolm Wallop), 6 (comments of Sen. Dale Bumpers), 8 (comments
of Secretary of the Interior James Watt); THE USE OF LAND, supra note 33, at 118-19; New Jersey
Conservation Foundation, supra note 3, at I (comments of Gordon A. Millspaugh, Jr.).
41. See PRIVATE LANDS, supra note 2, at 10.
42. See WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 447, 490-91 (statement of Robert Coughlin); FEDERAL
LAND ACQUISITION, supra note 26, at 75; PRIVATE LANDS, supra note 2, at 25; THE USE OF LAND,
supra note 33, at 131-33; W. WHYTE, supra note 2, at 32; Coughlin & Plaut, supra note 26, at 456;
Sax, Buying Scenery: Land Acquisitions for the National Park Service, 1980 DUKE L.J. 709, 725-26.
Presumably the variation in price depends on factors such as the nature of the restrictions
imposed by the specific servitude, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, the degree to which the
seller reduces the selling price due to sympathy with the conservation purposes of the servitude, see
W. WHYTE, supra note 2, at 36; compensation to the transferor in the form of federal income tax
deductions, see I.R.C. § 170(0, (h) (1982), or local real estate tax relief, see PROTECTING NATURE'S
ESTATE: TECHNIQUES FOR SAVING LAND, supra note 2, at 55; W. WHYTE, supra note 2, at 36,
potential alternative uses of the property, and the pressure of development in the surrounding area,
see Carroll, City Urges Preservation of Staten Island Greenbelt, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1983, § 1, at 34,
col. 4.




purchase price, but also the cost of removing this land from the private
sector, which both decreases real estate tax revenue available to state and
local governments 44 and eliminates the benefits of increased employment
and resource exploitation from currently or potentially productive prop-
erty.45 Presumably, such indirect costs would result whether the buyer
was a tax-exempt conservation association or the government.
Conservation servitudes alleviate some of the realty tax revenue loss
because the owner of the land subject to the servitude continues to pay
property tax on the fee interest.46 Although conservation servitudes de-
crease public revenue by lowering the assessed value of the burdened fee
estate, the loss is not total. It may still be significant, however, because
strict conservation restrictions on undeveloped land in a developing area
may greatly reduce its assessed value and thus greatly lower revenues. 47
It is more difficult to determine whether conservation servitudes al-
leviate the societal cost of removing productive land from private owner-
ship. Although a conservation servitude leaves the seller with fee title,
strong limitations on the use and development of the land may greatly
reduce its productive value.
(c) Maintenance expenses. -Maintenance and administrative
expenses, 48 the third cost component of fee ownership, place a burden on
private and governmental conservation activities. There is evidence that
inadequate funding has prevented needed maintenance and restoration of
some federally owned lands.49 If so, the goal of conservation and preser-
44. See, e.g., WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 8 (remarks of Secretary of the Interior James Watt);
Coughlin & Plaut, supra note 26, at 455.
45. See THE USE OF LAND, supra note 33, at 119; WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 8 (remarks of
Secretary of the Interior James Watt), 20 (statement of John B. Crowell, Jr.). The psychological
benefits to society resulting from governmental conservation purchases probably would counter
some of these indirect costs.
46. For statutes requiring the parcel subject to a conservation servitude to be assessed at a
lower rate, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-109 (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 14-4-5.5-3 (Burns 1973);
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 247(3) (McKinney 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11943 (Purdon Supp.
1983).
47. This actual situation is discussed in New Jersey Conservation Foundation, supra note 3, at
20 (remarks of Clifford Starret) (discussing a 95% reduction in property value after encumbrance by
a conservation servitude). Additional transaction costs may occur because the reappraisal process is
difficult and some local authorities may balk at lowering the assessed value. See Cunningham, supra
note 2, at 204-05. But see W. WHYTE, supra note 2, at 42-43 (suggesting that although the existence
of a conservation servitude may lower the property tax revenues from the servient parcel, the pres-
ence of open space may increase the value of surrounding properties and draw additional residents,
thus raising property tax revenues).
48. See Coughlin & Plaut, supra note 26, at 455.
49. See FEDERAL LAND ACQuIsITION, supra note 26, at 7-9; WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 14
(remarks of Secretary of the Interior James Watt).
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vation obviously is hindered; 50 further, government may be allowing a
deterioration of property that would not occur under private
ownership.51
One respect in which conservation servitudes are superior to fee in-
terests is that maintenance and operating expenses are borne by the fee
owner, not the servitude holder.5 2 On the other hand, although both
servitude and fee ownership require expenditures to monitor and enforce
ownership rights,53 these expenses may be greater with servitudes be-
cause the fee owner has free access to the burdened property and thus has
greater opportunity to violate the restrictions.
2. Benefits of Nongovernmental Ownership.-In addition to the
cost savings of servitudes over fees, private rather than governmental
ownership of servitudes further alleviates the drain on the public purse
because any cash outlay will not be directly from the government. But
the federal government will still suffer a revenue loss from income tax
deductions for contributions of qualifying conservation servitudes to pri-
vate associations under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code. 54
When servitudes are donated to governmental entities, however, the en-
suing revenue loss through deductions55 may be more acceptable because
the government receives the donation and the public obtains direct con-
trol over the servitude.
Private ownership may be cheaper, however, because private as-
sociations may pay less than fair market value, especially if sellers share a
concern with the association or receive tax benefits, and because these
50. See WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 8 (remarks of Secretary of the Interior James Watt), 630
(statement of Andrew L. Johnson).
51. See id at 4 (remarks of Sen. Malcolm Wallop). The Reagan administration has expressed
concern over inadequate stewardship by the government and has proposed the shifting of funds from
acquisition of new land to maintenance of currently owned property. See FEDERAL LAND ACQUISI-
TION, supra note 26, at 7-9.
52. See WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 448, 453; PRIVATE LANDS, supra note 2, at 25; Coughlin
& Plaut, supra note 26, at 455.
53. Close monitoring is important because damage to conservation property may be irreparable
and money damages may never compensate for the destruction of environmentally unique land. See
Cunningham, supra note 2, at 182. The experience of the federal government indicates that without
monitoring and enforcement the advantages of a conservation servitude can be quickly lost. See
infra note 282.
54. I.R.C. § 170(0, (h) (1982). Private associations promote the availability of tax benefits to
solicit donations of conservation servitudes. See FEDERAL LAND ACQUISITION, supra note 26, at 27;
PROTECTING NATURE'S ESTATE: TECHNIQUES FOR SAVING LAND, supra note 2, at 46; W.
WHYTE, supra note 2, at 36; American Farmland Trust, Farmland Facts: The Tax Benefits of
Contributing Farmland and Farmland Easements, reprinted in WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 750,
754-57, 759-60 (promotional brochure describing tax benefits of contributing conservation ease-
ments); Maryland Environmental Trust, supra note 2; The Nature Conservancy, supra note 2; New
Jersey Conservation Foundation, supra note 3.




associations may be able to complete transactions with landowners who
prefer a private group's flexibility or simply dislike selling to the govern-
ment. Public agencies can duplicate these savings, though, even if only
by policies that encourage the use of private associations as
intermediaries.
5 6
III. The Conflicting Values of Contract and Alienability
The failure of decisionmakers to accommodate the conflicting poli-
cies inherent in private conservation servitudes in gross is symptomatic
of their failure to address such concerns when they are discussing general
servitudes. When faced with the question of the validity or enforceability
of various real covenants, courts often state their intention to accommo-
date two conflicting policies: freedom and enforceability of contract ver-
sus free alienability and unrestricted use of land.5 7 Too often, however,
this statement is a mechanical recitation, with the decision in fact resting
on narrower grounds or on other (often unarticulated) policy concerns.58
Rarely are these conflicting values explicated and applied to the specific
facts of the case.59 This Part analyzes how these contract and alienability
doctrines bear on private conservation servitudes in gross.
60
56. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. There are cases in which private associa-
tions have acquired conservation servitudes and transferred them to governmental agencies. See,
e.g., New Jersey Conservation Foundation, supra note 3, at 1. Federal land acquisition policy envi-
sions such an arrangement. See Office of the Secretary of the Interior, Final Guidelines for Transac-
tions Between Nonprofit Conservation Organizations and Federal Agencies, 48 Fed. Reg. 17,406
(1983).
57. See, e.g., Hays v. St. Paul Methodist Episcopal Church, 196 Ill. 633, 636, 63 N.E. 1040,
1042 (1902); Latham v. Taylor, 10 N.C. App. 268, 270, 178 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1970), cert. denied, 278
N.C. 104, 179 S.E.2d 452 (1971); Voyager Village Property Owners Ass'n v. Johnson, 97 Wis. 2d
747, 749, 295 N.W.2d 14, 15 (Ct. App. 1980).
58. See, eg., Benton v. Bush, 644 S.W.2d 690, 691-92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (stating the broad
contract/alienability dichotomy but ultimately relying on the policy of protecting land values,
beauty, and uniformity to enjoin violation of a servitude).
59. But see Swaggerty v. Petersen, 280 Or. 739, 744, 572 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1977) (questioning
whether the policy of untrammeled land use still applies in the era of public regulation of land). In
Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Smith, 1 Ariz. App. 424, 403 P.2d 828 (1965), rev'd, 101 Ariz. 101, 416
P.2d 425 (1966), the Arizona Court of Appeals relied on the policy of "free and untrammeled use of
the land," I Ariz. App. at 427, 403 P.2d at 831, to deny enforcement of "range use rights," but the
Arizona Supreme Court reversed referring to the policies of freedom and enforceability of contract,
101 Ariz. at 108, 416 P.2d at 432. Each court could achieve the result it desired by citing to one of
the competing doctrines, thus avoiding an examination of the policy concerns.
60. This Article does not focus on the touch and concern issue, another area in which policy
issues of covenants come into play, see, e.g., Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use
of Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 167, 207-33 (1970); Krasnowiecki, Townhouses with Homes Associations:
A New Perspective, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 718 (1975), because conservation servitudes closely
resemble building and use restrictive covenants, which are uniformly accepted as covenants that
touch and concern. See 5 R. POWELL, supra note 10, 1 67312][a]. Because conservation servitudes
are negative covenants, the policy issues inherent in enforcement of affirmative covenants, see, eg.,




A. The Contract Value
1. Contract Theory and Real Covenants. -Courts have stated that
real covenants are enforceable "like other contracts. ' 61 Because public
policy "favors the fullest liberty of contract and the widest latitude possi-
ble on the disposition of one's property," 62 the parties' intent must be
effected. As one court forcefully stated: "We start with the proposition
that private persons, in the exercise of their constitutional right of free-
dom of contract, may impose whatever restrictions upon the use of land
which they convey to another that they desire to impose."'63
Real covenants, however, are different from traditional two-party
contracts in both legal origins and policy imperatives. Real covenant law
predates modem contract law.64 Before the development of modem con-
tract law, real property law formulated easement and lien doctrines,
which, like real covenants, bind subsequent owners of land without their
express consent.65 Moreover, traditional bilateral contract analysis does
not easily lend itself to the law of real covenants, which are enforceable
not only by the original covenantee against the original covenantor but
also by and against their assignees. 66 Rather, traditional contract law
focuses on the bargain struck by parties dealing face to face. In contrast,
the fundamental task of real covenant doctrine has been to impute
promises to future generations who are not directly involved in the initial
agreements. The criteria for finding that a covenant can run and the
requirement that subsequent owners have notice of it may have devel-
oped in response to a discomfort about enforcing a promise against one
who did not specifically agree to it.67
61. Benton v. Bush, 644 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). Some courts state also that
enforcement is permitted only if no public policy would be breached thereby. See, e.g., Weir v.
Isenberg, 95 Ill. App. 3d 839, 842, 420 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1981); Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York
City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 92 A.D.2d 119, 127, 460 N.Y.S.2d 69, 75 (1983), affrd, 61
N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1984); Loeb v. Watkins, 428 Pa. 480, 484, 240
A.2d 513, 516 (1968). The difficult task is to determine when public policy is indeed offended.
62. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Watson, 65 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1953).
63. Gruble v. MacLaughlin, 286 F. Supp. 24, 31 (D.V.I. 1968).
64. See Browder, supra note 60, at 14.
65. See id. at 12; Newman & Losey, Covenants Running with the Land, and Equitable Servi-
tudes; Two Concepts, or One, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1319, 1330 (1970). Proponents of a unified law of
covenants and easements, see infra text accompanying note 73, conceive of a single concept "which
primarily partakes the qualities of what is presently described as an easement." Reichman, Toward a
Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1177, 1182 (1982).
66. For a discussion of the classic requirements for a covenant to run, see 5 R. POWELL, supra
note 10, 673[2]. The transfer of the benefit of the covenant to the assignee of the covenantee's
interest may not pose so great a problem today, given third-party beneficiary contract theory. See
Browder, supra note 60, at 12.
67. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 comment h (1944) (justifying the touch and con-
cern requirement as a means to reduce the number of permissible real covenants); Berger, supra note




Despite the differences between traditional contracts and real cove-
nants, however, both seek to effectuate arrangements created by private
volition; thus, the policy of freedom of contract applies to a degree to real
covenants. Recent scholarship suggests treating real covenants under
general contract doctrine. 68 Commentators point to the benefits of con-
sensual land use arrangements, 69 often preferring private agreements to
public controls such as zoning and subdivision regulation 70 and urging
enforcement by and against successors to the covenantee's and covenan-
tor's interests. Freedom of contract is central to these arguments,
71
although many suggest that it be tempered by various policy concerns,
and commentators differ significantly over whether real covenants
should be subject to public regulation.72 There are indications that the
promises binding remote parties); Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1360 (1982) (criticizing limitation of covenants through the touch and
concern requirement); Krasnowiecki, supra note 60, at 718 (stating that touch and concern require-
ment ensures that only covenants closely related to the land will bind subsequent owners); Newman
& Losey, supra note 65, at 1323 (suggesting the privity requirement is a meaningless attempt to
provide doctrinal support for passing a contract burden to a nonconsenting purchaser). For support
of the use of the touch and concern requirement, see Reichman, supra note 65, at 1233. Notice is
required to protect subsequent bona fide purchasers in at-law enforcement, see Newman & Losey,
supra note 65, at 1340, and equitable actions, Boyle v. Lake Forest Property Owners Ass'n, 538 F.
Supp. 765, 769 (S.D. Ala. 1982); Frey v. DeCordova Bend Estates Owners Ass'n, 632 S.W.2d 877,
879 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ granted).
68. See Berger, Some Reflections on a Unified Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1323
(1982); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Con-
trols, 40 U. CM. L. REV. 681 (1973); Epstein, supra note 67; French, Toward a Modern Law of
Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982); McDougal, Land-Use
Planning by Private Volition: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 16 ARIz. L. REv. 1 (1974);
Newman & Losey, supra note 65; Reichman, Judicial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL STUD.
139 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reichman, Judicial Supervision]; Reichman, supra note 65;
Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. CH. L. REV. 253 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Reichman, Private Governments]; Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some
Comments on Professors French and Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403 (1982). See generally
Berger, supra note 60 (demonstrating the advantages of treating all servitudes uniformly instead of
treating real covenants, easements, and equitable servitudes as different classes).
69. See, eg., Ellickson, supra note 68, at 715-16; Krasnowiecki, supra note 60, at 711-12; Mc-
Dougal, supra note 68, at 1-2; Reichman, Private Governments, supra note 68, at 253-54; Reichman,
supra note 65, at 1184.
70. See, eg., Ellickson, supra note 68, at 682 (noting that "conflicts among neighboring land-
owners are generally better resolved by systems less centralized than master planning and zoning");
French, supra note 68, at 1263 ("[T]he inherent shortcomings of public regulation encourage private
arrangements."); Lundberg, Restrictive Covenants and Land Use Control: Private Zoning, 34 MONT.
L. REV. 199, 217 (1973); Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. & ECON. 71, 91 (1970).
71. See Berger, supra note 68, at 1329, 1337 ("Unification theory clearly accords the intent of
the parties a dominant position in the interpretation of agreements."); French, supra note 68, at 1305
("Agreements creating servitudes can be treated like other agreements .... "). The intent of both
parties is relevant in construing a nongratuitous transfer, but only the grantor's intent is relevant in a
gratuitous transfer. Thus it appears that in a gift of a conservation servitude, only the donor's intent
should be considered. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 483 comments g, h (1944).
72. There is debate, for example, over whether courts initially should refuse to recognize a
promise as a real covenant for failure to meet certain technical requirements, such as touch and
concern, compare Reichman, supra note 65, at 1231-33 (arguing that the touch and concern requir-
ment promotes efficiency of termination and safeguards individual freedom), with Epstein, supra
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recent groundswell of support for unifying covenants at law, equitable
servitudes, and easements into a single law of "servitudes" springs from
the desire to facilitate enforceable consensual land use arrangements free
from unwarranted court interference.
73
2. The Theoretical Justifications and Applicability to Private Con-
servation Servitudes in Gross.-Although few courts explain how the pol-
icy of freedom of contract applies to real covenant law, some cases and
scholarship suggest the following reasons for enforcing real covenants
like general contracts: moral imperative, social stability, certainty, eco-
nomic utility, and freedom of choice. In determining the relevance of
these values to privately held conservation servitudes in gross, one must
keep in mind that such interests allow a private organization outside the
democratic political process to control from a geographic and temporal
distance the use by future generations of a potentially unlimited amount
of land.
(a) Moral obligation. -Moral reasons are often urged for en-
forcing real covenants. Two levels of moral obligation are involved: one
between the original covenantee and covenantor and another between the
successors of each. As to the first level, some courts have held that the
original covenantor should not be able to make a promise in exchange for
consideration and then effectively extinguish the promise by conveying
the land. One court remarked: "[I]t seems immoral for a party to be able
to evade an obligation it may have squarely confronted in making its
bargain."' 74 If that is the concern, however, one wonders why the courts
enforce an agreement against the covenantor's successor, rather than
"punish" the original covenantor by holding him liable.75
note 67, at 1360-64 (rejecting the policies underlying the touch and concern test), and the use of
public policy, compare Browder, supra note 60, at 34 (suggesting that "good reason does exist to find
a burden on use unreasonable in some circumstances"), with Epstein, supra note 67, at 1364-68
(criticizing public intervention).
73. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 68, at 1337 (flexibility to accommodate special circumstances);
Ellickson, supra note 68, at 716 ("The present judicial attitude fortunately seems to favor elimination
of those unnecessary barriers to bargaining among neighbors."); French, supra note 68, at 1265
(advantages of simplification and modernization); McDougal, supra note 68, at 7 (encourage land-
use planning); Reichman, supra note 65, at 1182 ("arbitrary categorization of servitudes").
74. Bill Wolf Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline Corp., 41 A.D.2d 950, 951,
344 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31-32 (1973) (quoting lower court opinion at 70 Misc. 2d 314, 319, 333 N.Y.S.2d
472,479 (Sup. Ct. 1972)); see also Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774, 778, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144 (Ch.
1848) ("[N]othing could be more inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able to sell
the property the next day for a greater price."); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 539 comment f
(1944) ("[M]en should be required to live up to their promises ....").
75. Berger, supra note 68, at 1335-36. Courts also could encourage parties to agree that the
covenantor bind his assignees in the same manner that he is bound. See, eg., Finley v. Glenn, 303




As to the second level of moral obligation, some argue that the con-
venantor's successor, having notice of the covenant and presumably tai-
loring his bargain accordingly, should not be able to evade the promise.76
This view, however, places the cart before the horse: only after one de-
cides that a covenant can be enforced against a successor can one con-
clude that a person contracting with notice is morally bound to follow it.
Even accepting arguendo both levels of the morality rationale, two
issues remain with respect to private conservation servitudes in gross.
First, the public interest may outweigh the private morality of enforce-
ment. Second, even if specific enforcement were denied, the servient
owner could be held liable for damages and thus remain bound by his
word.
(b) Social stability.-Social stability is another oft-adduced rea-
son for the specific enforcement of real covenants. People vigorously re-
sist any judicial attempt to limit their property rights. Reaction is
especially strong when a person's interest in his home is diluted or taken
by judicial decree.77 The termination of a homeowner's real covenant
right to prevent commercial development on an adjacent lot can create
antipathy toward the judicial system and perhaps social unrest,78 espe-
cially if the termination seems to favor powerful interests over lesser
interests.
Certain distinctions, however, between general and conservation ser-
vitudes should not be ignored. The termination of an in gross conserva-
tion servitude in no way disturbs the holder's right of home ownership
because the servitude is unrelated to a dominant parcel on which a home
76. See Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 413, 103 N.E. 194, 198 (1913); Welitoff v. Kohl, 105
N.J. Eq. 181, 187-88, 147 A. 390, 393 (1929) ("[I]t would be unfair to permit one, who had bought
presumably at a lower price because of the imposed restrictive covenant, to make a profit by selling
at a higher price clear of the restriction."); Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774, 777-78, 41 Eng. Rep.
1143, 1144 (Ch. 1848) (holding that a court can enforce a "covenant being one which does not run
with the land" if subsequent purchaser takes with notice of restriction).
77. See Loeb v. Watkins, 428 Pa. 480, 484, 240 A.2d 513, 516 (1968) ("Where a man's land is
concerned, he may impose... any restriction he pleases."); Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.,
208 Pa. 540, 555, 57 A. 1065, 1071 (1904); O.W. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 167-68 (1923)
(noting the strong psychological reaction against removal of property in one's possession).
78. See Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 166, 172 N.E.
455, 457 (1930) ("Rightly or wrongly he believes that the comfort of his dwelling will be imperiled
.") (emphasis added); Mechem, The Peasant in His Cottage: Some Comments on the Relative
Hardship Doctrine of Equity, 28 S. CAL. L. REv. 139, 144 (1955) ("[IThe doctrine persists, not
because the plaintiff is a cottager or poor, but because of the underlying, the basic concept, that
private ownership of a dwelling house is still the most inviolable of all property rights."). But see
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 225, 257 N.E.2d 870, 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 316-
17 (1970). In Boomer, the court forced the homeowners to accept pollution of their neighborhood
for the greater good of the whole community, but also granted the homeowners a permanent injunc-
tion conditioned on compensation for damage to their property.
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could be built. Moreover, it is an oversimplification to cast judicial su-
pervision as an assault against private ownership rights by a vague con-
cept of the public interest. It is more accurately viewed as a conflict
between the societal goals of full development and conservation.
Even assuming that social stability is an important value, enforce-
ment of privately owned conservation servitudes in gross may not effec-
tuate that goal. Judicial legitimation of an absent, undemocratic entity's
veto power, frustrating the servient owner's interests and society's needs,
will often foster disrespect for the legal system and thus actually may
decrease social stability.
(c) Certainty.-Some commentators favor private land use ar-
rangements over governmental land controls because "there is never any
certitude that a particular scheme of [public] controls will remain un-
modified over a period of time."' 79 Political and economic pressures may
change governmental regulations, but private agreements protect against
such "uncertainty. ' 80 Others assert that strict enforcement of real cove-
nants against future owners, without permitting defenses, increases "cer-
tainty" of result, because property rights may remain unsettled if judicial
results depend on each judge's "view of justice."81
Conservation servitudes are certainly an attempt to preserve the en-
vironmental status quo; thus permanence is essential. But is the "cer-
tainty" of private land use controls more important than the flexibility of
governmental regulation in the conservation servitude context? Because
the purported justification for private conservation servitudes is that they
serve the public interest,82 it is incongruous to deride the judgment of
society's democratically elected representatives as to the best future use
of land. Given the potentially large geographical scope of privately
owned conservation servitudes in gross, flexibility should not be ignored.
Even the social goals that private conservation servitudes aim to promote
require constantly evolving responses.
79. Consigny & Zile, Use of Restrictive Covenants in a Rapidly Urbanizing Area, 1958 Wis. L.
REv. 612, 614.
80. WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 488-89 (statement of Robert Coughlin); see Consigny & Zile,
supra note 79, at 614; Ellickson, supra note 68, at 691-93; French, supra note 68, at 1263 n.6; Siegan,
supra note 70, at 142-43.
81. C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 185
(2d ed. 1947); see Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 5, 101 N.E. 805, 806 (1913); Rick
v. West, 34 Misc. 2d 1002, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
82. Direct public support of private conservation servitudes includes federal tax deductions for
donations of conservation restrictions, see I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (1982), state property tax relief, see
supra note 46, and statutory validation of such interests, see supra note 13. This support appears to




(d) Efficiency.-Some commentators have argued that freedom
of contract achieves efficient allocation of scarce land resources without
wasteful acquisition of fee title.8 3 Real covenants arise in the market-
place only if the value of the reduction in future disturbances exceeds the
loss of flexibility and the administrative costs of enforcement. Continuity
in the enforcement of real covenants encourages these utility-maximizing
market transactions.
Even if one makes the normative assumption that efficiency is a
valid goal,84 it is not clear that a classic "free market transaction" takes
place when a conservation servitude is donated to a nonprofit organiza-
tion, because the public pays the monetary consideration through a fed-
eral tax deduction. Further, nonprofit groups working for open space
conservation may not operate as "rational maximizers"; dedication to
preserving unique land characteristics may cause decisions not based on
maximization of wealth.85 Nor is it clear that a concern for stability of
investments86 plays a significant role in private conservation servitudes in
gross. A history of court decisions modifying conservation servitudes
may not cause potential donors to withhold donations; rather, they may
think their donations all the more necessary. 87 Moreover, if the donor is
motivated by a tax deduction, rather than by concern for a particular
parcel of land, the possibility of subsequent modification of the servitude
for public policy reasons may not be a disincentive. Courts could re-
quire, for example, that the servient owner compensate the organization
on judicial termination of the servitude; with the investments protected,
judicial modification might not discourage associations from purchasing
servitudes.8 8 Even if some disincentive does result, other societal goals
may be furthered.
Even those who argue that consensual servitudes are efficient recog-
nize that much of their discussion rests on, and is limited to, a model of
reciprocal servitudes in a previously undeveloped residential subdivi-
83. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 68, at 713-14 (arguing that covenants generated by market
forces tend to promote efficiency); Reichman, supra note 65, at 1184, 1231-32; Reichman, Private
Governments, supra note 68, at 302-03.
84. See Beckwith, Developments in the Law of Historic Preservation and a Reflection on Liberty,
12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 93, 159 (1976); Reichman, supra note 65, at 1232.
85. See Gilmour, Private Interests and Public Lands, 59 CURRENT HaST. 36, 36 (1970) ("Most
[private conservation societies] do have one important feature in common: they serve no special
economic purposes nor do they attempt to claim economic benefits for their members.").
86. Some commentators suggest that the certainty of use appurtenant to restrictive covenants
and land-use regulations would release funds that otherwise would be used to ensure against the
possible deleterious effects of a sudden change in land use. See, eg., Evangelical Lutheran Church of
the Ascension v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 166-68, 172 N.E. 455, 457 (1930); Kmiec, Deregulating
Land Use" An Alternative Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 28, 40 (1981).
87. But see Berger, supra note 68, at 1331.
88. See infra subpart V(A)(2)(b).
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sion,8 9 which evokes none of the questions raised by conservation servi-
tudes held by private organizations. Proponents also concede that
covenants create problems "when they impose external costs on third
parties, creating suboptimal resource allocation and unfairness." 90
(e) Freedom of choice.-Freedom of contract in real covenants
permits individuals to exercise freedom of choice with respect to their
land,91 a value so ingrained in our culture and legal tradition that it
hardly needs elaboration. The difficult task is to determine its limitations
and the extent of permissible societal control, for there is a danger that
the contractual autonomy of one individual will usurp the ability of
others to control their destinies and frustrate society's ability to provide
for the common good. Consequently, close scrutiny of such contractual
arrangements is required.
Some support for private ownership of conservation servitudes
comes from the view that the government should avoid, if possible, tak-
ing land from private hands.92 This view is based not only on the limited
public purse but also on a normative and political preference for less ac-
tive government. 93 Supporters of diminished government land acquisi-
tion note that the federal government owns approximately one-third of
the surface rights of American land94 and claim that "private sector"
conservation efforts are more efficient than government stewardship. 95
But this is merely a normative preference without empirical justification.
One can easily question whether privately owned conservation servitudes
should be enforced in perpetuity without examination, or instead should
be scrutinized for reasons of social policy.
89. See Ellickson, supra note 68, at 716-18; Reichman, Private Governments, supra note 68, at
263-65.
90. Ellickson, supra note 68, at 714.
91. See Epstein, supra note 67, at 1359 ("We may not understand why property owners want
certain obligations to run with the land but as it is their land, not ours, some very strong reason
should be advanced before our intentions are allowed to control.") (emphasis in original); Reichman,
Judicial Supervision, supra note 68, at 158 (promoting domain of individual decisionmaking);
Reichman, Private Governments, supra note 68, at 277, 303-04 (recognizing "freedom to transact"
and "freedom of choice").
92. See WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of Secretary of the Interior James Watt), 20
(statement of John B. Crowell, Jr.).
93. See id. at 12-14 (statement of Secretary of the Interior James Watt); Cities Turn to Private
Groups to Administer Local Services, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1983, at Al, col. 2. In some respects, this
position reflects the belief in "privatization"-the shift of traditionally governmental functions to the
private sector.
94. See WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 2 (statement of John B. Crowell, Jr.), 8 (statement of
Secretary of the Interior James Watt).




3. Conclusion.-The traditional rationales for freedom of con-
tract-moral obligation, certainty, efficiency, and freedom of choice-
are relevant to private conservation servitudes in gross. None appears so
compelling, however, that it requires strict enforcement of private con-
servation servitudes in gross without judicial and legislative modifica-
tions in light of other policy considerations.
B. The Policy Disfavoring Restrictions on Land
1. The Meaning of the Doctrine. -In real covenant cases courts
have balanced freedom of contract against a distrust of restrictions on
land. Some refer to this distrust as a policy of free and unrestricted use
of land.96 Others call it a policy against restraints on alienability. 97 For
simplicity, "antirestrictions policy" will be the term used here. The an-
tirestrictions policy, though often briefly referred to under one name or
another by courts, is seldom explicated in court opinions and actually
addresses three distinct concerns: stalling economic development, hinder-
ing marketability, and thwarting future needs.
(a) Economic development and ties on land.-The nineteenth
century view of full economic development 98 may explain why some
courts support the antirestrictions policy. 99 Under this view, land is
purely an article of commerce, valued neither for its feudal social power
and prestige nor for its subjective importance as the family home. °°
Consequently, some claim that an antirestrictions policy allows land to
be shifted to new uses required by business notwithstanding a pre-
existing servitude. 10' Today, however, American society has generally
96. See University Hill, Inc. v. Patton, 427 F.2d 1094, 1099 (6th Cir. 1970); Hays v. St. Paul
Methodist Episcopal Church, 196 Ill. 633, 636, 63 N.E. 1040, 1042 (1902); Whitmarsh v. Richmond,
179 Md. 523, 527, 20 A.2d 161, 163 (1941); Kitching v. Brown, 180 N.Y. 414,427, 73 N.E. 241,245
(1905); Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 92 A.D.2d 119,
126, 466 N.Y.S.2d 69, 74 (1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1984);
Ragland v. Overton, 44 S.W.2d 768, 771 ('ex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1931, no writ).
97. See Mountain Springs Ass'n v. "Wilson, 81 N.J. Super. 564, 575, 196 A.2d 270, 277 (Ch.
Div. 1963); Eagle Enters. v. Gross, 39 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 349 N.E.2d 816, 820, 384 N.Y.S.2d 717,
720-21 (1976).
98. See M. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 31-34
(1977); Madden, supra note 33, at 9-18 (describing the commodity concept of land).
99. See Bachman v. Colpaert Realty Corp., 101 Ind. App. 306, 315, 194 N.E. 783, 787 (1935);
Ragland v. Overton, 44 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1931, no writ); see also C.
CLARK, supra note 81, at 72 (expressing the "ingrained view that land interests should be made
freely available for commercial development").
100. See, e.g., Ragland v. Overton, 44 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1931, no
writ). The court stated: "In this country real estate is an article of commerce. The uses to which it
should be devoted are constantly changing as the business of the country increases, and as its new
wants are developed." Id. (quoting 4 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 3361, at 473 (1924)).
101. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 539 comment f (1944) (stating that a policy con-
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rejected full development in favor of conservation. Thus, the full devel-
opment rationale provides an inadequate justification for voiding conser-
vation servitudes.
(b) Hampering of marketability.--Others contend that market-
ability is at the root of the antirestrictions policy. 10 2 Judge Clark stated
that restrictions on land may "render titles unmarketable,"' 0 3 or "hold
up an advantageous sale,"' 104 presumably because of the difficulty in lo-
cating owners of various interests and agreeing with them to remove the
servitude. 0 5 Consequently, he opposed the assignment of servitudes in
gross.106 The American title system and the free market mechanism,
however, ameliorate this problem.' 0 7 Because the holder of a servitude
must record it or risk losing it to a bona fide purchaser, 0 8 a potential
purchaser easily can identify outstanding claims and negotiate for their
removal or adjust his price accordingly. Hence, the marketability justifi-
cation is not persuasive.
Some proponents of conservation servitudes have argued further
that because marketability cannot justify servitudes, the antirestrictions
policy is entirely invalid. 10 9 Freedom of contract, therefore, requires the
enforcement of a consensual private conservation servitude as written.
Although the marketable title issue is too minor to cause courts to void
cern in enforcing covenants is that "land should be developed to its normal. . . capacity"); NEW
YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Acts, Recommendation and Study Relating to Recording, Ex-
tinguishment and Modification of Certain Restrictions on the Use of Land, in REPORT OF THE LAW
REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1958, at 211, 225-26 (1958) (recognizing that "business needs" are
hindered by old restrictions). Some suggest that the rule against restraints on alienation serves to
check transactions that cause grossly inefficient use of land. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS
OF LAW § 18.5, at 393 (2d ed. 1977); Reichman, Private Governments, supra note 68, at 282.
102. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT Acr introductory note, 12 U.L.A. 51, 52 (Supp.
1984); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 3160 (1944) (introductory note to Part III); C. CLARK, supra
note 81, at 72, 82, 159-60; French, supra note 68, at 1283; Netherton, supra note 6, at 553-54;
Reichman, supra note 65, at 1189-90;
103. C. CLARK, supra note 81, at 72.
104. Id. at 73.
105. See, e.g., Boatman v. Lasley, 23 Ohio St. 614, 618 (1873) (indicating the difficulties with the
devolution of title of an easement in gross); E. CLARK, L. LUSKY & A. MURPHY, GRATUITOUS
TRANSFERS 831-32 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing the difficulties in tracing owners of interests in property
and the effect on alienability).
106. C. CLARK, supra note 81, at 73.
107. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT AcT Commmissioners' prefatory note, 12 U.L.A.
51, 51 (Supp. 1984) ("by eliminating certain outmoded easement impediments which are largely
attributable to the absence of a land title recordation system in England centuries earlier"); French,
supra note 68, at 1283; Netherton, supra note 6, at 553-54; Reichman, supra note 65, at 1190.
Reichman asserts that because of the title system, the American legal system never developed the
English law prejudice against servitudes. See id.
108. See Johnson, Purpose and Scope of Recording Statutes, 47 IOWA L. REV. 231 (1962)
(describing the three major types of American recording acts: notice, race-notice, and race).
109. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT AcT, 12 U.L.A. 51, 52 (Supp. 1984); Netherton,
supra note 6, at 553-54, 556-57, 566.
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all in gross servitudes,' 10 that is not the predominant concern underlying
the antirestrictions policy; the more important goal of limiting dead hand
control may outweigh the value of freedom of contract in the context of
private conservation servitudes.
(c) Limiting dead hand control. -Limiting dead hand control
is the most compelling reason for the antirestrictions policy.II Real cov-
enants allow landowners to bind future owners of the servient tract; thus
current owners may determine choices of future generations. In an era of
shrinking resources, allowing former owners to frustrate the aspirations
of current owners is of special concern. Proponents of freedom of con-
tract argue that dead hand control is "fair" as long as there is notice,' 1 2
but this begs the question whether the deprivation of individual opportu-
nity and autonomy is itself "fair." It would be difficult today to argue,
for example, that enforcing a covenant of racial segregation is justified by
notice.1 3 Moreover, because of concerns of limited opportunity and po-
tential for social unrest, the law sometimes superimposes on contracts its
own view of fairness.' '4
The dead hand adversely affects not only individual owners, but also
society as a whole. The market response of a future property owner to
the future needs of society is likely to be more effective than a past
owner's fixed blueprint. Although the Rule Against Perpetuities gener-
ally does not control real covenants, the lesson of the rule concerning the
need to limit the ties of former owners should not be ignored.11 5 A bal-
ance should be struck that will uphold consensual land use arrangements
without frustrating the needs of future generations.
2. Conservation Servitudes and Dead Hand ControL-Although
some have doubted the relevance of free alienability and unrestricted use
110. But see Minch v. Saymon, 96 N.J. Super. 464, 470, 233 A.2d 385, 388 (Ch. Div. 1967)
(difficulty in locating the owner of the benefit of a covenant in gross may cause problems in
negotiations).
111. Professor Simes' classic explanation of the policy against dead hand control in the context
of the Rule Against Perpetuities appears in 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTER-
ESTS § 11.17, at 13-14 (West 2d ed. 1956).
112. See French, supra note 68, at 1282 (discussing the value of "fairness" in the sense of pro-
tecting parties from the liability a reasonable person would not expect to incur and only imposing
liability that meets parties' reasonable expectations).
113. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Ellickson, supra note 68, at 715.
114. For example, consider the warranty of habitability discussed infra note 165.
115. For courts recognizing dead hand control in real covenants, see Copelan v. Acree Oil Co.,
249 Ga. 276, 278, 290 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1982); In re Turners Crossroad Dev. Co., 277 N.W.2d 364, 368




of land to conservation servitudes,' 1 6 several factors cut against this view.
First, because of land's unlimited life, real covenants, unlike many other
contracts, theoretically control in perpetuity.'1 7 Second, although tech-
nology may increase the amount and uses of land under human con-
trol,118 the supply is limited. Third, land ownership has a special
importance in the American experience." 9 Finally, there is no inherent
limit to the amount of land that can be restricted by private conservation
servitudes in gross. In contrast, the appurtenance requirement in classic
servitude law provides that only owners of neighboring properties can
own covenants in the servient parcel.' 20 This requirement limits the
number of parties capable of exercising veto power over any particular
tract. 21 More importantly, the appurtenance requirement limits the
amount of veto power any one individual can obtain over land of others
because of the practical difficulties and expense of acquiring adjacent
land.
Traditionally, the power to control development of a broad geo-
graphical area has been reserved to the community through planning,
zoning, and subdivision approval.' 22 Although an individual could exert
116. See Browder, supra note 60, at 43; Epstein, supra note 67, at 1360 (rejecting the view that
freedom of alienability is concerned only with the "condition of the land itself and its amenability to
future disposition" and arguing instead that such "freedom" actually refers to the the owner's free-
dom to act as he chooses); Netherton, supra note 6, at 555 ("There is much to suggest that the area
of justifiable restriction has widened significantly in the past twenty-five years. . . [T]he present
generation clearly recognizes that some situations call for putting a higher priority on management
than on development of land.") (emphasis in original); Reichman, supra note 65, at 1237.
117. Certain legal doctrines, including changed conditions and relative hardship, allow termina-
tion of a seemingly perpetual real covenant or deny specific enforcement and allow only a damages
remedy. See infra subpart V(A).
118. See D.H. MEADOWS, D.L. MEADOWS, J. RANDERS & W. BEHRENS, THE LIMITS TO
GROWTH 51 (1972); THE USE OF LAND, supra note 33, at 13-14, 123-24; Scholle, Will There Be
Enough Land?, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Oct. 1981, at 18, 18-19. Proponents of conservation servitudes
recognize the limited supply of land; it motivates the conservation ethic.
119. See C. BEARD & M. BEARD, BASIC HiSTORY OF THE UNrrED STATES 255-56, 294 (1950);
Madden, supra note 33, at 13.
120. Appurtenant covenants have built in limitations on the area against which they can be
enforced. See Rogers v. Zwolak, 12 Del. Ch. 200, 201-02, 110 A. 674, 675 (1920); Stegall v. Housing
Auth., 278 N.C. 95, 101-03, 178 S.E.2d 824, 828-29 (1971) (in stage development of sixty-acre tract,
no intent to allow for enforcement by owners in one stage against another); RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 537 illustration 4 (1944) (indicating that a distance of three blocks between the benefit-
ted and burdened parcels might prevent the covenant from running); A. DUNHAM, supra note 20, at
22.
121. See, e.g., Caullett v. Stanley Stillwell & Sons, Inc., 67 N.J. Super. 111, 117, 170 A.2d 52, 56
(App. Div. 1961); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 comment h (1944).
122. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 188-
90, 336 A.2d 713, 732-33 (1975) (indicating that there must be consideration not only of the require-
ments of the local entity, but also of the needs of the region). TEx. RE. CIV. STAT. ANN, arts.
974a-1, 974a-2 (Vernon Supp. 1983) provide for yet another way to involve the public in seemingly
private land use controls. Art. 974a-I allows for some local governments to enforce privately negoti-
ated subdivision covenants; art. 974a-2 allows some local governments to refuse to issue a building




power over his neighbors through an appurtenant real covenant, deci-
sions about nonneighboring land were reserved to government. If a fee
owner chose to build, one who did not own neighboring property could
not use a covenant to veto the development. Because the special features
of private conservation servitudes in gross heighten the concerns of dead
hand control, including intrusion on democratic values, exacerbation of
class conflict, and reduction of flexibility in land use, traditional views of
freedom of contract and consensual arrangement should be modified in
this area.
(a) Democratic values.-American public opinion is split over
the amount and type of community growth that is desirable.123
Although society benefits from democratic debate over these controver-
sial issues, the veto power held by owners of private conservation servi-
tudes in gross preempts this debate. Current zoning and subdivision
processes may deserve criticism,124 but they do promote representative
democracy, accountability, and full debate of the issues.125 Each person
can participate in determining the growth of the community; this partici-
pation reinforces personal autonomy 126 and social stability. Society may
allow a person control over his neighbor's activities through an appurte-
nant real covenant because it is willing to accept the covenantee's judg-
ment that the neighbor's activities may be harmful to the covenantee
himself. It is quite different for a private group owning an in gross servi-
tude to substitute its judgment for the community's, and to bar develop-
ment even though the community's subdivision and zoning processes
permit and even encourage it.
(b) Class issues and the structure of private organizations.-A
decision to maintain the environmental status quo can disproportionately
123. See R. NASH, supra note 33, at 236-62. Nash discusses the bitter controversy over develop-
ment and preservation in the 1960s and early 1970s. He also details Americans' ambivalence to
wilderness, which he attributes to the fact that American national pride is based on both having and
destroying wilderness. Consider, also, the battle between Congress and the Department of the Inte-
rior over the leasing of public wilderness lands for mineral exploration. See Congress To Try To Ban
Oil Leasing in Wild Areas, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1982, at 34, col. 1; Wilderness Areas Are Debated
Again, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1982, at 34, col. 1.
124. See Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 719 (1980).
125. See Henning, Natural Resources Administration and the Public Interest, 30 PUB. AD. REV.
134 (1970) (discussing how bureaucratic decisions with respect to natural resources give effect to the
public interest).
126. See Krasnowiecki, supra note 124, at 722 ("Local governments are the last direct contact
that the average citizen has with the idea of government; it is the only place where the citizen still
feels that his individual participation might make a difference."); Shore, What Do People Want?, in
THE GOOD EARTH OF AMERICA, supra note 33, at 88, 96-99 (discussing the importance of direct
public participation in land use planning).
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affect the needs of the less affluent groups in society. 127 Recent events at
Columbia University illustrate this problem. In 1968, after student pro-
tests that community needs were not being met, Columbia abandoned
plans to build a gymnasium in a nearby park. A recent dispute has
arisen, however, between Columbia students who seek to restore the park
to its condition as first designed almost one hundred years ago and vari-
ous Harlem community groups seeking more public facilities.12
8
Even William H. Whyte, Jr., one of the earliest proponents of con-
servation servitudes, described the "muted class and economic conflicts"
involved, 129 asserting that the class donating conservation servitudes is
generally the "gentry":
Characteristically, the gentry have a strong bias for the "natural"
countryside, and it is the preservation of this that the easement
device promises. When they think of open space, they usually
don't think of parks, or lakes for recreation, or the landscaping
along super-highways; they think of farmland, streams and mead-
ows, white fences, and barns. Many such people feel they should
be for park programs, but more from an abstract sense of obliga-
tion than from any personal impulse. If they're for parks, it's likely
to be for parks somewhere else, and if they get to talking candidly,
it's not long before they'll reveal a definite distaste for the idea of
picnic benches and formal landscaping.130
The potentially turbulent nature of these class issues131 is exacer-
bated when private foundations control land use through their ownership
of conservation servitudes. Professor David A. Lipton describes non-
profit foundations as "self-appointing, self-perpetuating. . . often paro-
chial in composition. . . [and] neither selected by nor responsible to any
constituency."1 32 Private foundations lack the elective democracy and
127. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 174, 336
A.2d 713, 724 (1975) (indicating that a locality has a legal obligation to provide by its land regula-
tions a realistic opportunity for the development of its regional fair share of low and moderate in-
come housing).
128. See Carmody, supra note 30, at BI, col. 1.
129. W. WHYrE, supra note 2, at 37; see R. NASH, supra note 33, at 169; Rose, Preservation and
Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 478 (1981).
130. W. WHYTE, supra note 2, at 37. Whyte apparently expects a governmental entity to be the
ultimate holder of conservation servitudes. See id. at 8, 9, 37, 50-52.
131. Professor Rose examines governmental efforts in historic preservation, such as government
sponsored redevelopment, Rose, supra note 129, at 524-33, and landmark and district architectural
controls, id. at 496-97. She persuasively argues that the "chief function of preservation is to
strengthen local community ties and community organization," id. at 479, and advocates a public
decisionmaking process to allow for the presentation of different views and to heighten self-govern-
ance, id. at 517-33. Although Professor Rose focuses on governmental, rather than private, activities
and on historic, rather than environmental, preservation, her concern for democratic participation is
relevant to privately held conservation servitudes in gross.
132. Lipton, Significant Private Foundations and the Need For Public Selection of Their Trustees,
64 VA. L. REv. 779, 781 (1978).
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accountability of the public land use regulation system.
The General Accounting Office, noting that nonprofit conservation
groups acquire land and resell it to federal agencies, questioned whether
the relationship between these private organizations and federal agencies
"might be influencing how the Federal agencies establish their land ac-
quisition priorities."1 33 The GAO and the Office of Management and
Budget proposed guidelines providing that the purchasing agency's plans
for the land "must be paramount to those of the nonprofit conservation
organizations" and that government land acquisitions through such or-
ganizations must be "in accord with priorities outlined by the agency." 1 34
Public land purchase and control should not be governed by unilateral
action by nonaccountable officials. Although private conservation servi-
tudes do not involve public ownership of land rights, the concern about
the interplay of nonelected individuals and public land use planning still
merits consideration because of the potential for class abuse in such deci-
sionmaking and the nonrepresentative structure of the decisionmakers.
(c) Flexibility. -Professor Jan Krasnowiecki argues persua-
sively that despite the common belief that development is best regulated
by a group of "self-administering" rules established long before actual
development begins, little development actually occurs under preexisting
zoning.1 35 Rather, the zoning system adjusts to permit development.'
36
He argues that the zoning structure should be recast as primarily an ad-
judicatory system to achieve flexibility, the participation of all interested
parties, and clearer decisionmaking.1
37
Various private land use arrangements also encourage flexibility.
Setting a fixed duration for real covenants lessens dead hand control.' 38
Allowing homeowner's associations to alter and enforce subdivision re-
strictions promotes flexibility by removing veto power from the
individual.' 3
9
Flexibility is necessary in conservation servitudes as well. Although
133. FEDERAL LAND ACQUISITION, supra note 26, at 26.
134. Office of the Secretary of the Interior, Proposed Guidelines for Transactions Between Non-
profit Conservation Organizations and Federal Agencies, 48 Fed. Reg. 4055 (1983); see Office of the
Secretary of the Interior, Guidelines for Transactions Between Nonprofit Conservation Organiza-
tions and Federal Agencies, 48 Fed. Reg. 17,406 (1983); Office of the Secretary of the Interior,
Guidelines for Transactions Between Nonprofit Conservation Organizations and Federal Agencies,
48 Fed. Reg. 36,342 (1983).
135. Krasnowiecki, supra note 124, at 719-20.
136. See generally Kmiec, supra note 86, at 53-57 (discussing zone variance, amendment, and
conditional use as means of infusing flexibility into the zoning process).
137. Krasnowiecki, supra note 124, at 747.
138. For examples of fixed duration real covenants, see infra note 256.
139. See infra subpart IV(A)(1)(b).
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current social needs call for preserving the environment and limiting de-
velopment, this may not always be so. Even if conservation remains the
dominant value, today's vision of what is environmentally significant
may change tomorrow. 140
Further, an overly rigid conservation servitude may undermine it-
self. Many of the violations of conservation servitudes arise from an in-
flexible response to the servient owner's need to obtain a reasonable use
from his land.1 41 Flexibility also can alleviate the personal hardship of
servient owners.142
Public ownership of conservation servitudes combined with the
democratic process is one way to avoid rigidity. Servitudes could be ac-
quired under a plan, preventing haphazard accumulation of land ties that
frustrate growth.143 Additionally, supervision by government agencies
could prevent loss of the covenants. 44 The government owner could or-
der modification or termination of servitudes based on other pressing
public requirements.' 45 Private organizations could still advocate their
140. See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 208; Scenic Easements, supra note 27, at 12; Dunlop,
Landmarks, Too, Often Change With the Times, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1983, § 4, at 8, col. 1. The
New York City Landmarks Preservation Law provides for modification of restrictions if, among
other reasons, the property provides an "insufficient return." N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE ch. 8A,
§ 205-1.0(a) (1976); see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 108-13 (1978)
(discussing the New York City preservation statute).
141. Coughlin and Plant, supra note 26, at 460, assert that unless the servient owner is permitted
some reasonable economic use of the land, and unless the servitude holder responds to changes, the
servient owner may violate the servitude. For indications that violations of conservation servitudes
occur with second generation servient owners and not the original covenantor, see supra note 27.
142. Examples of personal hardship arising from a conservation servitude include a covenant
restriction barring the fee owner from building a second home on the property for the owner's chil-
dren, see Benton v. Bush, 644 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982), and the inability of a fee title
owner to use the land in a manner that provides adequate revenues to pay property taxes, see Scenic
Easements, supra note 27, at 8-9.
143. See Acquisition Policy, supra note 2, at 24,793 (requiring each area of the National Park
System with an active land acquistion program to have a land acquisition plan, outlining strategy,
priorities, and schedule; during the development of the plan members of the public are to be given
the opportunity to present their views); see also Cunningham, supra note 2, at 203-06 (describing the
established criteria that an effective conservation servitude program uses in its selection). Local
governments also could institute such programs.
144. Despite some past difficulties with governmental enforcement of conservation servitudes,
there are no indications of inherent problems with government enforcement. See Higgins, supra note
2 (describing federal officials' supervision of conservation servitudes). Congress has expressed con-
cern, however, about loss of the benefits of conservation servitudes through nonenforcement; it fears
losing revenue by allowing a deduction without an accompanying public benefit. See S. REP. No.
1007, supra note 2, at 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6749.
145. Legislatures can alter the rules governing the acquisition and sale of land interests owned by
the government to create new standards that reflect current societal concerns and meet emerging
problems. A good example of federal government flexibility with respect to ownership of public
land, including conservation servitudes, is the Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, § 401, 84
Stat. 1770, 1781 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1500-1500e (1982) (omitted pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 5316 (1982) (terminating authority to make grants under the Act)). 42 U.S.C. § 1500a
(1982) authorizes grants to state and local governments to finance the acquisition of open space
areas. Apparently servitudes can be purchased with such funds. Id. § 1500a(1) ("title to, or other
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positions and seek public support for their views.146
C. Other Concerns
1. Basis for Examining Servitudes. -Why should a private organi-
zation's decision to bar development on Blackacre be accepted without
question if it is the fee owner of the parcel, but subjected to scrutiny if it
holds only a conservation servitude in gross? Although this is a difficult
question, differences between servitudes and fees, as well as the practical
ramifications of servitude ownership by conservation groups, require that
conservation servitudes be examined more closely.
The potential magnitude of conservation servitudes as opposed to
fee interests is one reason to treat the two interests differently. Because
conservation servitudes can be purchased for as little as fifteen percent of
the value of a fee interest, 47 private groups can subject more land to veto
control by acquiring servitudes than by acquiring fees. Also, landowners
may be more likely to donate a servitude than a fee simple because they
retain title and the rights of use and possession.
48
Further, the law is appropriately concerned with the unique rela-
tionship among those owning interests in the same piece of land. Con-
flicts arise because co-owners often wish to use the land in different ways.
The law's accommodation of these divergent claims must be based not
only on the parties' expectations but also on societal goals. Consider, for
example, how society's view of land as a commercial asset plays an im-
portant part in the law of ameliorative waste;149 how the increased auton-
interest, in"). A grant is made only if the acquisition is pursuant to a unified open space program, id.
§ 1500b, thus helping to prevent random land acquisition. Moreover, the local government can
convert open space land bought with a grant to other uses if substitute open space is provided and
"the conversion [is]. . .needed for orderly growth and development." Id. § 1500c(2). Thus, modi-
fication can address new societal requirements, and land patterns are not frozen in perpetuity. Yet
the requirement that modifications accord with the comprehensive land use plan prevents communi-
ties from subverting the federal legislative purpose by using existing land rather than the more ex-
pensive route of purchasing private land. See, e.g., Schicke v. Romney, 474 F.2d 309, 316 (2d Cir.
1973); see also 16 U.S.C. § 4601-8(f)(3) (1982) (dealing with grants to states to acquire property and
envisioning the conversion of such property to other uses subject to certain requirements); id.
§ 4601-22(a) (land acquired by the United States Secretary of the Interior for the National Park
system can be transferred by the Secretary subject to terms that will assure use of the property
consistent with the authorized purpose). The federal government also permits land not needed for
national parks to be turned over to the General Services Administration for sale. See FEDERAL
LAND ACQUISITION, supra note 26, at 8-9.
146. See Sierra Club v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 114 Misc. 2d 52, 450 N.Y.S.2d 677
(Sup. Ct. 1982) (private organization disputing governmental decision with respect to a government
owned conservation servitude). See generally Hair, The Roles of Nongovernmental Conservation Or-
ganizations, FISH & WILDLIFE NEws, Oct./Nov. 1981, at 12 (describing the role of private organi-
zations in representing and educating the public).
147. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
148. See W. WHYTE, supra note 2, at 36.
149. See, e.g., Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 9-15, 79 N.W. 738, 739-40 (1899).
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omy of wives in the recent law of tenancies by the entirety reflects the
changes in American social structure; 50 and how the value of due pro-
cess shapes the law of cooperatives and condominiums. 51 Because servi-
tudes involve relative rights between fee holder and servitude owner, past
experience with co-owned property supports special treatment for servi-
tudes, as opposed to fees, held by conservation groups. Ownership of a
piece of land in fee simple absolute does not present these problems.
Our society acknowledges that the fee owner of a piece of land has
the right to decide present and, to some extent, future use of the land.
52
The power is justified by the increased autonomy it brings the fee holder.
Thus, the right of a conservation group owning a fee simple interest in
land to devote it to preservation purposes is protected. In contrast, a
servitude in gross threatens the servient owner's autonomy, and thus de-
serves scrutiny.
The distinction between servitudes and fee interests held by private
organizations also reflects a separate body of law dealing with real cove-
nants that has existed at least since 1583.153 Although traditional real
150. See, e.g., Sawada v. Endo, 57 Hawaii 608, 610-13, 561 P.2d 1291, 1294-95 (1977); West v.
First Agricultural Bank, 382 Mass. 534, 542-50, 419 N.E.2d 262, 267-71 (1981).
151. See, e.g., Johnson v. Keith, 368 Mass. 316, 320, 331 N.E.2d 879, 882 (1975).
152. See Mechem, supra note 78, at 139-40.
153. This is the date of Spencer's Case, 5 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583), one of the
earliest real covenant cases. Other common-law devices could be used to achieve the same conserva-
tion purposes as a real covenant, such as the possibility of reverter reserved by the grantor, a power
of termination retained by the grantor, and an executory interest granted to a third party. See R.
BRENNEMAN, supra note 2, at 36-49; A. DUNHAM, supra note 20, at 5-31; Beckwith, supra note 84,
at 126-30; Browder, supra note 60, at 43. Such interests would be subject to court scrutiny, however,
and the same results suggested herein for conservation real covenants and easements probably would
occur for these other common-law devices. First, because of concerns over forfeiture, courts con-
strue these three interests strictly, see A. DUNHAM, supra note 20, at 13-14; Beckwith, supra note 84,
at 127, and use constructional devices to limit their effect, see A. DUNHAM, supra note 20, at 12.
Also, courts may employ the same public policy analysis for these interests as they do for real cove-
nants. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 111, § 286; Beckwith, supra note 84, at 130. The
changed conditions doctrine may apply to possibilities of reverter and rights of entry. See A. DUN-
HAM, supra note 20, at 12. In addition, the Rule Against Perpetuities will control third party execu-
tory interests. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 111, § 11, at 235-36.
As another alternative, a landowner willing to surrender fee title to the land could convey it in
trust for conservation purposes to a charitable corporation or governmental entity subject to condi-
tions on its use. See, eg., Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 164 Conn.
337, 338-39, 321 A.2d 469, 470-71 (1973) (trust providing for purchase of school land, prohibiting
mercantile or manufacturing activities); Nickols v. Commissioners of Middlesex County, 341 Mass.
13, 23-24, 166 N.E.2d 911, 919 (1960) (conveyance of Walden Pond shoreland subject to condition
that it be preserved). Such trusts are not immune to close judicial scrutiny, however, and may be
subject to termination or modification. See Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 286, 135
A. 555, 564 (1926) (voiding a portion of a trust restricting height of buildings and terms of leases on
realty as violating "public policy" and injurious to the "public welfare"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 62 (1959) (invalidating trust provisions when enforcement "would be against public
policy").
Conservation restrictions also might be created through leasehold interests. See R. BRENNE-
MAN, supra note 2, at 33-35. Leases that contain covenants restricting the property, however, would
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covenant rules may not have evolved from conscious social policy, the
reduction of land ties achieved by these rules is of great concern today.
If real covenant law is being relaxed for policy reasons to allow private
conservation servitudes in gross, it seems appropriate to add limitations
to help ensure that the public interest ultimately will be served. More-
over, the occasion of recognizing a new property interest is the best time
to add a standard of scrutiny for public benefit, because only then is there
no expectation that the new property interest will be free from such
examination.
2. The Role of Eminent Domain.-Private conservation servitudes
in gross raise two related issues involving eminent domain: First, would
it be deemed a taking if a court refused to specifically enforce a privately
held conservation servitude, limiting the covenantee's remedy to dam-
ages? Second, should formal eminent domain procedures be the exclu-
sive means of effectuating the public interest in the efficient use of land?
(a) Denial of injunction as a taking.-Courts have expressly
held that denying an injunction to specifically enforce a real covenant
and limiting the covenantee to damages is not a taking requiring the exer-
cise of eminent domain, 154 whether denial is based on judicial discre-
tion 55 or on statutory guidelines for equitable enforcement of
covenants. 156 The rationale for this holding is that the granting of an
injunction is not a matter of right, but a matter of judicial discretion. 57
Moreover, even if the denial is a taking, there is an adequate public pur-
pose, and compensation through money damages makes the taking con-
stitutional. 158 An even broader curtailment of remedies-a real covenant
extinguished by judicial decree with no right of damages-has been held
not to violate the Constitution.' 59 Thus, one of the approaches proposed
be subject to judicial scrutiny as covenants running with the land. See, e.g., Spencer's Case, 5 Co.
16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583).
154. See Blakeley v. Gorin, 365 Mass. 590, 595-601, 313 N.E.2d 903, 906-10 (1974); Rossi v.
Sierchio, 30 N.J. Super. 575, 584, 105 A.2d 687, 692 (App. Div. 1954). For criticism of the Gorin
decision, see Rose, supra note 68, at 1414 n.48. See generally M. HORWITZ, supra note 98, at 53
(discussing the issue of eminent domain inherent in the 19th century Mill Acts).
155. See Rossi v. Sierchio, 30 N.J. Super. 575, 581-83, 105 A.2d 687, 690-91 (App. Div. 1954).
156. See Blakeley v. Gorin, 365 Mass. 590, 604-07, 313 N.E.2d 903, 912-14 (1974).
157. One court has stated: "The Legislature has appropriately left the decision on specific en-
forcement of these rights where it has traditionally resided, in the sound discretion of a judge of a
court of equity. It seems inappropriate to transform this discretionary remedy into a constitutional
right." Id. at 598, 313 N.E.2d at 909. Injury to the public is a factor for the court to consider in its
discretion to grant an injuction. See Ames v. Schlaeger, 386 Ill. 160, 166, 53 N.E.2d 937, 940 (1944);
G.H. Sternberg & Co. v. Cellini, 16 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6, 305 N.E.2d 317, 321 (1973).
158. See Blakeley v. Gorin, 365 Mass. 590, 598-601, 313 N.E.2d 903, 909-10 (1974).
159. See Amana Soc'y v. Colony Inn, Inc., 315 N.W.2d 101, 111-13 (Iowa 1982) (rejecting due
process and contracts clause challenges to Iowa's "stale use" statute) (discussed infra subpart
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by this Article-judicial limitation of the covenantee's remedy to dam-
ages if the public interest so requires160-passes constitutional muster.
(b) Eminent domain as the sole remedy.-A more difficult
question is whether to permit judicial refusal to specifically enforce pri-
vately held conservation servitudes or to make the formal eminent do-
main procedure the exclusive route to effectuate society's interest.
Eminent domain taking of an existing servitude is certainly possible.
16'
Professor Richard Epstein opposes judicial modification or termination
of servitudes because of changed conditions or because the servitude has
become wasteful, obsolete, or unreasonable,162 suggesting instead that
"the state . . . intervene under its eminent domain powers, but only
when it acts for 'public use.' "163
Yet there are policy reasons why expression of the public interest
need not be limited to eminent domain. Human interactions and social
reality are far too complex to leave only a choice between two extremes:
unfailing adherence to an in gross servitude on one hand and resort to
the cumbersome eminent domain process on the other. 64 Framing the
issue as freedom of contract versus majoritarian intrusion ignores too
IV(C)); In re Turners Crossroad Dev. Co., 277 N.W.2d 364, 373 (Minn. 1979) (dictum suggesting
that a Minnesota statute placing a thirty-year limit on restrictive covenants is constitutional); see also
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978) (suggesting in dictum
that legislators can limit common-law remedies without violating the due process clause).
160. See infra subpart VI(A)(3).
161. See Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 164 Conn. 337, 341-44,
321 A.2d 469, 472-73 (1973); Lake Forest District v. Frecska, 85 Il. App. 3d 610, 407 N.E.2d 137
(1980). Some statutes permit eminent domain as a means to terminate a conservation servitude. See
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1205(d) (Supp. 1983); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51095 (West 1983); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, § 6815 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-9-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976); see also A. DUNHAM,
supra note 20, at 6-7, 23, 27 (seeking to prevent eminent domain taking of private conservation
servitudes); W. WHYTE, supra note 2, at 45-46 (proposing stipulation that later public domain con-
demnation void easement).
Eminent domain power can also be used to create conservation servitudes. See Kamrowski v.
State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 265-66, 142 N.W.2d 793, 797 (1966); Mo. REV. STAT. § 67.885 (1978); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5008 (Purdon Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 20-1-7(11) (Supp. 1984). But see
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06(2) (West Supp. 1983); KY. REV. STAT. § 65.460 (1980); TEx. NAT. REs.
CODE ANN. § 181.060 (Vernon 1978); W. WHYTE, supra note 2, at 15-20; Costonis, supra note 10, at
612-17; Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 239, 264-65 (1976) (discussing reasons why government might hesitate to use its eminent do-
main power); id. at 270 (indicating that some conservation zoning may rise to the level of a taking
requiring compensation).
162. Epstein, supra note 67, at 1358. Professor Epstein also states that once "notice [is] secured
by recordation, freedom of contract should control." Id.
163. Id. at 1367; see Rose, supra note 68, at 1412 ("The right to hold out, for whatever idiotic
reasons, is an aspect of the right to hold property. It is normally relaxed only through an eminent
domain proceeding for a public purpose, a proceeding which is approved by the elected representa-
tives of the community.").
164. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (describing different possible levels of
protection of property rights).
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many other important concerns associated with private conservation ser-
vitudes in gross.
There are numerous examples of legal adjustment of the relative
rights of contracting parties without resort to eminent domain.165
Although it is difficult to define the public interest, and a danger of im-
properly favoring one private interest over another exists, 166 such
problems have been handled satisfactorily before through common-law
decisionmaking. 1
67
Furthermore, the compensation requirement of eminent domain is
troubling if a federal income tax deduction is allowed to those who do-
nate conservation servitudes to charitable organizations. The public
purse is then twice tapped for the benefit of the private organization.
1 68
This is ironic, because public benefit is the rationale for validation of
privately held conservation servitudes and the income tax deductions.
IV. The Specific Issues-In Gross Enforcement, Duration, and the
Role of Public Policy
Rather than focusing on contract and alienability in servitude cases,
courts usually rest their decisions on narrow legal grounds with close
attention to precedent. Three of these grounds are of special relevance to
conservation servitudes: the validity of servitudes in gross, the effect of
unlimited duration, and the public policy considerations articulated by
the courts. Analysis of these matters can guide legislatures in enacting or
amending servitude statutes, aid courts in deciding whether the common
law permits such interests, and enable policymakers to determine
whether enforcement of legislatively or judicially authorized conserva-
tion servitudes should continue.
165. Consider the residential warranty of habitability that is implied into leases and cannot be
waived by the tenant. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.58 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985);
5 R. POWELL, supra note 10, 746 (listing numerous examples of diminution of property rights
through judicial and legislative action).
166. See Blakeley v. Gorin, 365 Mass. 590, 616, 313 N.E.2d 903, 918 (1974) (Quirico, J., dissent-
ing); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 634-35, 304 N.W.2d 455,
458-59 (1981).
167. These issues arise by necessity in easements in which ownership rights are shifted from one
person to another to prevent the loss to society of landlocked land, see Martino v. Fleenor, 148 Colo.
136, 365 P.2d 247 (1961), and in the law of nuisance, see Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d
219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
168. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51095 (West 1983) does not provide compensation for an eminent
domain taking of a conservation servitude that has been donated to a private association. See also
KY. REV. STAT. § 65.476 (1980) (providing compensation to landowner for taking of land burdened
by scenic easement donated to local legislative body).
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A. In Gross Versus Appurtenant Interests
There are three distinct categories of real covenants. The first is the
in gross interest, in which the benefit of the servitude is not appurtenant
to a dominant parcel owned by the covenantee. 169 The second is an ap-
purtenant real covenant burdening the land of the covenantor, A, for the
benefit of neighboring property owned by the covenantee, B, whose own
parcel is burdened by an identical covenant for the benefit of A's land.
This type of covenant will be called here a "reciprocal subdivision cove-
nant." The third category consists of covenants with the benefit appurte-
nant to a nearby piece of land but without a reciprocal covenant
benefiting the covenantor. This kind of covenant will be called here a
"nonreciprocal appurtenant covenant." Examination of these categories
of covenants illuminates how courts have treated and ought to treat the
policy concerns inherent in private conservation servitudes in gross.
1. The Policy Concerns.
(a) Appurtenancy as promoting flexibility. -Limiting covenants
to neighbors encourages flexibility because neighbors, especially in ad-
joining residential lots, usually try to accommodate one another to main-
tain good relations. 170 Disputes are often settled informally. An owner
seeking relief from a covenant can rely on this neighborhood goodwill.
Similarly, the possibility of social sanctions from an intransigent owner's
neighbors also encourages informal dispute resolution.
Reciprocal subdivision covenants generate a particularly strong in-
centive for flexibility because the owner asked to compromise today may
seek compromise in the future. In contrast, the owner of an in gross
servitude often is not near the land; the chances of flexibility through
compromise are accordingly reduced.
(b) Democracy and reciprocal subdivision covenants.-Many
subdivision arrangements give the power to enforce and modify the re-
ciprocal subdivision provisions to a homeowners association.1 71 Such de-
cisions are voted upon by association members or delegated to elected
officers. 172 This allows the community as a whole to act democratically,
169. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 453-454 (1944); AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 17, § 9.32.
170. See Romans v. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 14 N.W.2d 482 (1944); Hassinger v. Kline, 91
A.D.2d 988, 457 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1983).
171. See Merrionette Manor Homes Improvement Ass'n v. Heda, 11 111. App. 2d 186, 187-88,
136 N.E.2d 556, 557 (1956); Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278
N.Y. 248, 253-54, 15 N.E.2d 793, 794-95 (1938); Krasnowiecki, supra note 60, at 716.




protected from an individual's veto.1 73 Further, the association is an
ongoing institution and may take a broader, more long-term view than
any single member, thus enhancing flexibility and compromise.174
(c) Self-determination. -Both reciprocal and nonreciprocal ap-
purtenant covenants allow the covenantee to prevent uses of the servient
parcel that directly harm him or interfere with his control over his imme-
diate environment. When a right is asserted under an appurtenant servi-
tude, the dominant landowner decides what is in his interest; he, of
course, is uniquely suited to make that decision. In contrast, when a
private group enforces a conservation servitude in gross, it makes a judg-
ment that society is being harmed, a decision about the needs of others
that the private association is not clearly qualified to make.
175
2. Examination of the Cases.-Although courts usually fail to ad-
dress clearly these specific policy considerations (mentioning only the
contract-alienability dichotomy), there are some exceptions. Moreover,
from these cases a pattern emerges of favoring reciprocal arrangements
between neighbors and disfavoring the broad-sweeping veto power of
someone distant from the area.
(a) Reciprocal subdivision covenants. -Courts have expressly
and impliedly supported reciprocal subdivision covenants. Some courts
have focused appropriately on the specific subdivision policy considera-
tions, 176 emphasizing benefits to the residential environment 177 as well as
173. See Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 172 N.E. 455
(1930) (128 lot development in which all owners but one consented to variance of the covenant to
allow the erection of a church); Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
1519 (1982).
174. One jurisdiction even statutorily mandates community control over building restriction du-
ration regardless of whether the restriction was originally perpetual. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
780 (West Supp. 1983).
175. Other explanations have been offered for the appurtenance requirement. Professor French
claims that the appurtenance requirement serves to identify the owner of the servitude and thus
fosters negotiation between the dominant and servient owners over removal or modification.
French, supra note 68, at 1287, 1307. She offers an alternative to the appurtenance requirement to
deal with these concerns. Id. at 1307; see also Minch v. Saymon, 96 N.J. Super. 464, 469-71, 233
A.2d 385, 388-89 (Ch. Div. 1967) (appurtenance requirement not met when covenant benefited un-
named corporation in which grantor owned stock; subsequent servient owner cannot identify domi-
nant owner for negotiations).
176. See Bob Layne Contractor, Inc. v. Buennagel, 158 Ind. 43, 53, 301 N.E.2d 671, 678 (1973);
Beverly Island Ass'n v. Zinger, 113 Mich. App. 322, 329-31, 317 N.W.2d 611, 613-14 (1982); Swag-
gerty v. Peterson, 280 Or. 739, 744, 572 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1977); Benton v. Bush, 644 S.W.2d 690,
691-92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); Davis v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1981).
177. See Bob Layne Contractor, Inc. v. Buennagel, 158 Ind. App. 43, 53, 301 N.E.2d 671, 678
(1973); Lake St. Louis Community Ass'n v. Kamper, 503 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973);
Benton v. Bush, 644 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
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the increased value of the properties.1 78  One court determined that
"building and use restrictions in residential deeds are favored by public
policy"; 179 another thought it "doubtful" that "untrammeled land use"
should be continued. 180  It would be even more helpful if courts would
explicitly explore veto power, flexibility, and democracy.
Notwithstanding references to the free use of land and a historic
suspicion of real covenants, there are opinions broadly interpreting the
language of reciprocal subdivision covenants to exclude more activities
by the servient owner than the language indicates on its face.181 Courts
willing to imply a reciprocal subdivision covenant in the absence of an
express restriction 8 2 can hardly be biased against restrictions on land.
Rather, these courts attach particular value to the reciprocal subdivision
covenant. Some courts attach such significance to reciprocity that they
refuse to enforce subdivision covenants in the absence of mutuality. 183
(b) In gross servitudes.
(i) Majority rule real covenant cases.-If the benefit is in
gross, most courts do not allow the real covenant to run,8 4 whether in
178. See Davis v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1981). Thus, restricting land in such cases
increases, rather than decreases, the market value of residential property.
179. Beverly Island Ass'n v. Zinger, 113 Mich. App. 322, 325, 317 N.W.2d 611, 612 (1982).
180. Swaggerty v. Petersen, 280 Or. 739, 744, 572 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1977).
181. See Mock v. Schulman, 226 Cal. App. 2d 263, 267, 38 Cal. Rptr. 39, 42 (Dist. Ct. App.
1964) ("hedge" in height limitation included any natural growth); see also Alexander Schroeder
Lumber Co. v. Corona, 288 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
("structure" in setback provision included a wooden fence); Voyager Village Property Owners Ass'n
v. Johnson, 97 Wis. 2d 747, 748, 295 N.W.2d 14, 15 (Ct. App. 1980) (covenant barring placing of
"camping equipment not in use" included travel trailer); see also Annot., 13 A.L.R.4th 1346 (1982)
(collecting cases discussing the application of restrictive covenants to trees and shrubbery); Annot.,
75 A.L.R.3d 1095, 1109-10 (1977) (citing cases holding that a mobile home constitutes a structure).
But see Colony Park Ass'n v. Dugas, 44 Mich. App. 467, 468, 205 N.W.2d 234, 235 (1973) (finding
covenant prohibiting "tent, camping outfit, or other temporary structure" did not include mobile
home); Phillips v. Schwartz, 607 S.W.2d 203, 207-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (finding term "trailer"
included mobile homes but not camper-trailers).
182. See Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 481, 197 N.E. 224, 226 (1935); Sanborn v. McLean,
233 Mich. 227, 229-30, 206 N.W. 496, 497 (1925); AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 17,
§ 9.32.
183. See Welsch v. Goswick, 130 Cal. App. 3d 398, 405, 181 Cal. Rptr. 703, 707 (1982)
("[M]utual equitable servitudes. . . become unenforceable absent mutuality of obligation."); Davis
v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561, 568 (Tex. 1981) ("A contrary holding would be inconsistent with the basic
concept underlying the use of restrictive covenants that each purchaser in a restricted subdivision is
subjected to the burden and entitled to the benefit of the covenant.").
184. See'Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 378, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940); Berryman
v. Savoy Co., 160 Cal. 559, 573, 117 P. 677, 682 (1911); Chandler v. Smith, 170 Cal. App. 2d 118,
120, 338 P.2d 522, 523-24 (1959); Foreman v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 114 Md. 574, 579, 80 A.
298, 300 (1911); Orenberg v. Johnston, 269 Mass. 312, 315-16, 168 N.E. 794, 795 (1929); Duncan v.
Academy of the Sisters of the Sacred Heart, 350 S.W.2d 814, 819 (Mo. 1961); Welitoff v. Kohl, 105
N.J. Eq. 181, 188-89, 147 A. 390, 393 (1929); Minch v. Saymon, 96 N.J. Super. 464, 468-69, 233
A.2d 385, 387-88 (Ch. Div. 1967); Caullett v. Stanley Stillwell & Sons, Inc., 67 N.J. Super. 111, 116,
170 A.2d 52, 54-55 (1961); Wilmurt v. McGrane, 16 A.D. 412, 416-17, 45 N.Y.S. 32, 34 (1897);
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actions seeking damages, 18 5 an injunction for breach1 86 or threatened
breach,t1 7 to quiet title, 88 or to specifically enforce a contract of sale. 89
These opinions are troubling for their lack of a clear rationale and their
failure to consider the relevant policies. Most rely on stare decisis or
precedents from other jurisdictions. 190 Yet some cases cited in these
opinions did not involve in gross real covenants and do not explain why
in gross enforcement should be denied. For example, DeGray v. Mon-
mouth Beach Club House Co. 191 is often cited for the proposition that in
gross real covenants are unenforceable. 192 This case actually deals with
an appurtenant real covenant and makes only a passing allusion to in
gross covenants by way of quoting yet another court's opinion. 93 Simi-
larly, Badger v. Boardman, 194 also cited for the nonenforceability of in
gross real covenants, 195 prevented what appeared to be an appurtenant
covenant from running because there was no intent to benefit the domi-
nant parcel.
A few majority rule cases do attempt to explain the rule's basis, but
their efforts are far from satisfactory. Some make brief references to free
use of land. 196 Others, with circular logic, declare that because the origi-
nal covenantee no longer owns land to which the benefit inures, he no
Stegall v. Housing Auth., 278 N.C. 95, 102, 178 S.E.2d 824, 829 (1971); Craven County v. First-
Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 516-17, 75 S.E.2d 620, 631 (1953).
185. See Conduit v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166, 26 N.E. 198 (1885); Inhabitants of Middlefield v.
Church Mills Knitting Co., 160 Mass. 267, 35 N.E. 780 (1894).
186. See Storey v. Brush, 256 Mass. 101, 152 N.E. 225 (1926).
187. See Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Il1. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913).
188. See Chandler v. Smith, 170 Cal. App. 2d 118, 338 P.2d 522 (1959); Caullett v. Stanley
Stillwell & Sons, Inc., 67 N.J. Super. 111, 170 A.2d 52 (App. Div. 1961); Welitoff v. Kohl, 105 N.J.
Eq. 181, 147 A. 390 (1929).
189. See Craven County v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 75 S.E.2d 620 (1953);
Wilmurt v. McGrane, 16 A.D. 412, 45 N.Y.S. 32 (1897).
190. See Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 378, 101 P.2d 490, 492 (1940) ("It is true
...that a servitude cannot exist in gross .. "); Chandler v. Smith, 170 Cal. App. 2d 118, 119-20,
338 P.2d 522, 523 (1959) (citing Marra and Berryman v. Savoy Co., 160 Cal. 559, 117 P. 677
(1911)); Orenberg v. Johnston, 269 Mass. 312, 315, 168 N.E. 794, 795 (1929) ("the tradition of the
law"); Wilmurt v. McGrane, 16 A.D. 412, 416, 45 N.Y.S. 32, 34 (1897) ("a well-settled principle of
law").
191. 50 N.J. Eq. 329, 24 A. 388 (1892).
192. See, eg., Kotesky v. Davis, 355 Mich. 536, 539-40, 94 N.W.2d 796, 798 (1959); Genung v.
Harvey, 79 N.J. Eq. 57, 59, 80 A. 955, 956 (1911); Caullett v. Stanley Stillwell & Sons, Inc., 67 N.J.
Super. 111, 118, 170 A.2d 52, 56 (App. Div. 1961); Roger v. Reimann, 277 Or. 62, 67-69, 361 P.2d
101, 103 (1961); Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 556, 573 n.69 (1973); Annot., 21 A.L.R. 1281, 1285-86 (1922).
193. 50 N.J. Eq. at 337, 24 A. at 392 (1892) (quoting Nottingham Patent Brick & Tile Co. v.
Butler, 15 Q.B.D. 261, 268 (Q.B. 1885) (Wills, J.)).
194. 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 559 (1860).
195. See Orenberg v. Johnston, 269 Mass. 312, 316, 168 N.E. 794, 795 (1929); Craven County v.
First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 517, 75 S.E.2d 620, 631 (1953).
196. See Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 585-86, 333 P.2d 411, 415 (1958); Caullett v.
Stanley Stillwell & Sons, Inc., 67 N.J. Super. 111, 118, 170 A.2d 52, 56 (App. Div. 1961); Craven
County v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 513-14, 75 S.E.2d 620, 629 (1953).
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longer has a protectable interest.1 97 This reasoning fits a reciprocal sub-
division covenant designed to guarantee the community's environment-
once a homeowner sells and leaves, a violation of the covenant can no
longer harm him, and he should no longer be allowed to enforce it98-
but does not adequately address whether the burden should run if (as in
the case of in gross conservation servitudes) there is never a benefited
parcel.199
Although the majority rule avoids dead hand control, lack of clear
analysis hampers predictability and also could lead to the voiding of in
gross conservation servitudes that should be upheld. Orenberg v. John-
ston2°° illustrates the predictability problem. Orenberg is an early "his-
toric preservation easement" case. Land was conveyed by Harvard
Church to the defendant with a covenant obligating the grantee to "keep
the tower clock in its present position or substantially so or to erect it in
some other conspicuous place. ' 20 1 The church owned no other real
property to which the benefit of the servitude could be appurtenant. The
land was sold by the defendant to the plaintiff, who upon learning of the
covenant, sought to recover the consideration paid on grounds that the
covenant was a defect in title. The court held that because the benefit of
the covenant was in gross, it could not be enforced against the plaintiff.
Although this result fosters flexibility and democracy and blocks dead
hand control, the court did not evaluate these issues. Rather, it relied on
stare decisis: "[N]o reason whatsoever is shown for departing from the
tradition of the law in order to make [the covenant's benefit] follow the
land with its burden. ' 2
02
Wilmurt v. McGrane 203 is another example. The defendant objected
to the title tendered by the plaintiff, claiming that the plaintiff's predeces-
sor in title, Graham, had built a tenement house on an adjoining lot in
violation of the city's ordinance requiring space between buildings. In
return for the city's waiver of this violation, Graham had covenanted
197. See Genung v. Harvey, 79 N.J. Eq. 57, 59, 80 A. 955, 956 (1911) ("ceased to concern
him"); Stegall v. Housing Auth., 278 N.C. 95, 102, 178 S.E.2d 824, 829 (1971) ("a mere intruder").
198. See Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 586, 333 P.2d 411, 416 (1958); Genung v. Harvey,
79 N.J. Eq. 57, 59, 80 A. 955, 956 (1911); Graham v. Beermunder, 93 A.D.2d 254, 260, 462
N.Y.S.2d 231, 235-36 (1983); Stegall v. Housing Auth., 278 N.C. 95, 102, 178 S.E.2d 824, 829
(1971).
199. See Orenberg v. Johnston, 269 Mass. 312, 168 N.E. 794 (1929) (in gross covenant requiring
maintenance of a tower clock); Caullett v. Stanley Stillwell & Sons, Inc., 67 N.J. Super. 111, 170
A.2d 52 (App. Div. 1961) (in gross covenant granting covenantee the right to erect the original
dwelling on covenantor's land); Wilmurt v. McGrane, 16 A.D. 412, 45 N.Y.S. 32 (1897) (in gross
covenant prohibiting construction along a two foot corridor).
200. 269 Mass. 312, 168 N.E. 794 (1929).
201. Id. at 313, 168 N.E. at 795.
202. Id. at 315, 168 N.E. at 795.




with the Board of Health, which owned no other property in the area,20 4
to not erect any building along the two foot corridor at the rear of his
lots. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held for
the plaintiff, finding the covenant unenforceable because the Board of
Health held the benefit in gross. The court based its decision on this
"well-settled principle of law" 20 5 and did not explain its decision beyond
citing other cases.
Wilmurt is a case in which failure to analyze the reasoning behind
the majority rule caused an unsatisfactory result. Servitudes in gross
yielding a public benefit should be valid if held by a governmental entity,
because the concerns about dead hand control and lack of flexibility are
alleviated; the democratic process ensures that these entities will be re-
sponsive to the changing needs of society. It is ironic that wooden reli-
ance on stare decisis caused the public to lose the benefit of this
consensual land use covenant, especially because it was a substitute for
the legislative directive that the covenantor had violated.
(ii) Minority rule real covenant cases.-Some courts have
held specifically that the burden of a real covenant may run although tlie
benefit is in gross. 20 6 Other courts, while not expressly addressing the in
gross issue, have enforced covenants in which the benefit was in gross.
20 7
The facts and reasoning of these opinions, however, offer little support
for enforcement of perpetual privately held conservation servitudes in
gross. 208 Rather, they are specific responses to circumscribed situations,
upholding covenants limited in scope and without significant individual
veto power. The fact patterns fall into five groups.
First, there are cases that rely on an agency or alter ego theory to
allow enforcement of a real covenant by a party not owning a neighbor-
ing parcel.209 These are not really in gross cases; they involve appurte-
nant reciprocal subdivision covenants in which the enforcement right
204. See id. at 415-16, 45 N.Y.S. at 33-34.
205. Id. at 416, 45 N.Y.S. at 34.
206. See Van Sant v. Rose, 260 I11. 401, 404-06, 103 N.E. 194, 195-96 (1913); Riverbank Im-
provement Co. v. Bancroft, 209 Mass. 217, 223, 95 N.E. 216, 219 (1911); Neponsit Property Owners'
Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 259-60, 15 N.E.2d 793, 795-97 (1938).
207. See Staebler-Kempf Oil Co. v. Mac's Auto Mart, 329 Mich. 351, 356, 45 N.W.2d 316, 318
(1951); Bald Eagle Valley R.R. v. Nittany Valley R.R., 171 Pa. 284, 293-97, 33 A. 239, 241-42
(1895).
208. Some proponents of conservation servitudes have relied on these cases. See, eg., R. BREN-
NEMAN, supra note 2, at 58; A. DUNHAM, supra note 20, at 17-18.
209. See Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Bancroft, 209 Mass. 217, 223, 95 N.E. 216, 219 (1911);




was delegated to another,210 or in which the court permitted the subdivi-
sion developer-the original covenantee-"to aid in [the covenant's] en-
forcement for the benefit of [its] grantees.
' 211
Second, there are cases in which the covenantee, although she does
not own a fee simple interest in a nearby lot, owns a different type of
property interest either in a neighboring parcel212 or in the servient lot.
213
In one case, a court held that the original subdividers, who created recip-
rocal subdivision covenants but had sold all the lots, could enforce the
servitude because they held purchase money mortgages on some of the
lots and so had "a direct interest in the subject matter of [the] suit."
'214
Such cases involve a special variety of appurtenant covenants, rather
than true in gross interests, and engender different concerns about dead
hand control.
Third, there is the often cited 215 minority rule case of Van Sant v.
Rose,216 in which the conveyed land carried a covenant prohibiting tene-
ment buildings. The covenantee owned no other land in the area. The
covenantor subsequently conveyed the burdened parcel to his wife, who
sought to build an apartment house in violation of the restriction. The
court granted the covenantee's request for an injunction, specifically re-
jecting the claim that in gross enforcement was not permitted.217 To
claim that Van Sant stands for permitting the burden of a covenant to
run even if the benefit is in gross overstates the case. The covenantee had
a cause of action against the covenantor based on traditional contract
theory without need of real covenant law.218 The court merely prevented
the covenantor from evading the obligation by conveying the property to
his spouse. Van Sant thus teaches little about private conservation servi-
tudes in gross.
Fourth, there are cases in which the covenant requires the covenan-
tor or his successors to pay the original covenantee a share of the cost of
a party wall erected by the covenantee, if and when the covenantor or his
210. See Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 253, 15
N.E.2d 793, 794 (1938).
211. Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Bancroft, 209 Mass. 217, 223, 95 N.E. 216, 219 (1911).
212. See Storey v. Brush, 256 Mass. 101, 106, 152 N.E. 225, 226 (1925) (mortgagee of neighbor-
ing lot); Welitoff v. Kohl, 105 N.J. Eq. 181, 187-89, 147 A. 390, 393 (1929) (same).
213. See Bill Wolf Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline Corp., 41 A.D.2d 950, 951,
344 N.Y.S.2d 30, 311(1973) (mortgagee).
214. Storey v. Brush, 256 Mass. 101, 106, 152 N.E. 225, 226 (1925).
215. See R. BRENNEMAN, supra note 2, at 58; A. DUNHAM, supra note 20, at 17-18.
216. 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913).
217. See id. at 403-05, 103 N.E. at 195.




successors make use of the wall, 219 even though the covenantee may no
longer hold land in the area. Courts have held the covenants valid. 220
Such covenants differ from private conservation servitudes in gross in
that no veto is exerted and there is no restriction on the use of the servi-
ent parcel. The successor to the covenantor pays only once and only if
he benefits from the labor of the covenantee; such a one-time payment in
an ascertainable amount imposes no ongoing burden on the land.
Finally, there are cases allowing in gross enforcement of require-
ments covenants. 221 A number of these involve gasoline station premises
conveyed with a promise by the grantee to purchase the grantor's gaso-
line and related products. The courts have enforced these covenants
against successors to the covenantor. 222 Requirements covenants are un-
like conservation servitudes, however, in that they provide for a limited
duration, measured either by a specific expiration date223 or by the pe-
riod in which the covenantee engages in the business. 224 Courts note the
reasonableness of the duration before allowing the covenant to run,
225
demonstrating a concern about perpetual land ties. Further, the cove-
nantee often has a special relationship with the covenantor 226 -he may
help the covenantor to finance his business, for example-that justifies
enforcement on the ground of encouraging business. 227
Inhabitants of Middlefield v. Church Mills Knitting Co.,228 a case
enforcing an unusual covenant in gross, is worth attention. For many
years a road passed through Middlefield and over a bridge that the town
was obligated to repair. The owner of a parcel of land along the stream
wanted to erect a dam to provide power for a mill on his land. The
219. See Gibson v. Holden, 115 Ill. 199, 209-10, 3 N.E. 282, 286 (1885); Conduit v. Ross, 102
Ind. 166, 171, 26 N.E. 198, 199 (1885).
220. Gibson v. Holden, 115 Ill. 199, 206-07, 3 N.E. 282, 284-85 (1885); Conduit v. Ross, 102
Ind. 166, 170, 26 N.E. 198, 199 (1885).
221. See Trosper v. Shoemaker, 312 Ky. 344, 346-48, 227 S.W.2d 176, 178 (1949); Staebler-
Kempf Oil Co. v. Mac's Auto Mart, 329 Mich. 351, 356, 45 N.W.2d 316, 318 (1951); Bill Wolf
Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline Corp., 41 A.D.2d 950, 951-52, 344 N.Y.S.2d 30,
31-32 (1973); see also Smith v. Gulf Ref. Co., 162 Ga. 191, 194-95, 134 S.E. 446, 448 (1926) (lease-
hold covenant); Pratte v. Balatsos, 99 N.H. 430, 433-34, 113 A.2d 492, 494-95 (1955) (same).
222. Trosper v. Shoemaker, 312 Ky. 344, 347-48, 227 S.W.2d 176, 178-79 (1949); Staebler-
Kempf Oil Co. v. Mac's Auto Mart, 329 Mich. 351, 356, 45 N.W.2d 316, 318 (1951); Bill Wolf
Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline Corp., 41 A.D.2d 950, 951, 344 N.Y.S.2d 30, 32
(1973).
223. See Bill Wolf Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline Corp., 41 A.D.2d 950, 950,
344 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31 (1973) (ten years).
224. See Trosper v. Shoemaker, 312 Ky. 344, 347-48, 227 S.W.2d 176, 179 (1949).
225. See Bill Wolf Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline Corp., 41 A.D.2d 950, 951-
52, 344 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31-32 (1973).
226. See Bald Eagle R.R. v. Nittany Valley R.R., 171 Pa. 284, 297, 33 A. 239, 242 (1895).
227. See Staebler-Kempf Oil Co. v. Mac's Auto Mart, 329 Mich. 351, 358, 45 N.W.2d 316, 319
(1951).
228. 160 Mass. 267, 35 N.E. 780 (1894).
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landowner agreed with the town to pay for building and maintaining a
new bridge, because the raised water level would submerge the old
bridge. The miller subsequently conveyed title to the defendant, who re-
fused to maintain the new bridge. The town made necessary repairs and
sought damages for the cost, claiming the agreement ran with the
land.22 9 The defendant demurred to the complaint, and the trial court
held in his favor. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed,
finding that the agreement could run even though the benefit to the town
was in gross.230 Justice Holmes, writing for the court, observed:
[A]lthough ordinarily the corresponding right could not exist in
gross, yet, in the case of a way which a town is bound to keep in
repair for the benefit of the public, the town is the natural and
convenient protector of the obligation, and being immortal, and
locally fixed, may enforce a covenant originally made to it, without
being shown to be strictly the owner of the highway.
231
The opinion is of interest because it recognizes that when servitudes
in gross fill a particular public need, they merit enforcement rather than
an inflexible denial based on precedent. Similarly, because of their eco-
nomic advantages and their service to the conservation ethic, conserva-
tion servitudes often deserve recognition even though they conflict with
traditional rules against in gross interests.
Middlefield also recognizes the unique role of government in holding
and enforcing servitudes in gross created for the benefit of the public;
Justice Holmes describes the town as the "natural and convenient protec-
tor" of the servitude.232 In Orenberg v. Johnston,233 on the other hand,
the owner of the servitude in gross was a private party, and enforcement
was denied. Together, the cases lend support to conservation servitudes,
but militate against unfettered private ownership of conservation servi-
tudes in gross.
(iii) In gross easement cases. -Unlike covenants in gross, a
classic easement in gross usually binds future owners of the servient par-
cel.2 34 The law of servitudes thus has two distinct strains with respect to
in gross benefits. This division is not surprising, because covenants tradi-
tionally have been regarded with suspicion, while easements have been
229. See id at 268-69, 35 N.E. at 781.
230. See id. at 271-72, 35 N.E. at 782.
231. Id. at 272, 35 N.E. at 782.
232. Id
233. 269 Mass. 312, 168 N.E. 79 (1929).
234. See Kleinheider v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 528 F.2d 837, 840 (8th Cir. 1975); Upper Eagle
Valley Sanitation Dist. v. Carnie, 634 P.2d 1008, 1009 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Farrell v. Hodges





Proponents of private conservation servitudes in gross seek support
from the law of classic easements in gross.236 Additionally, both the cur-
rent movement for a unification of the law of easements and real cove-
nants and the tendency of courts to confuse the two interests237 may
cause application of the classic easement rule to validate private conser-
vation servitudes in gross. But this application should be resisted.
Although the integration of easements and real covenants is desirable as
a general matter, classic easement in gross cases involve facts and policies
different from those in conservation servitude cases. The choice of the
term "easement" 238 by supporters of conservation servitudes is unfortu-
nate if it leads some to believe that classic easement law should control;
results should turn not on labels but on factual contexts and policy
concerns.
One difference between classic easements and privately held conser-
vation servitudes in gross is that easements usually do not involve veto
power over the land of another. Typical easements in gross involve the
grant of sewer lines,239 railroad corridors, 24° oil and gas pipelines, 241
water lines,242 and rights of way243-clearly defined, limited interests,
affecting only a portion of the servient land. They are usually affirmative
easements, which allow the easement owner to act on the servient land,
rather than negative easements, which allow the easement owner to pro-
hibit the servient owner from acting. Thus, although the servient
235. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450(b) & comment h; Berger, supra note 68, at 1330
("[C]ourts traditionally accord greater deference to easement rights than to rights which derive from
covenants and servitudes.") (citing Waldrop v. Brevard, 233 N.C. 26, 31, 62 S.E.2d 512, 515 (1950));
Browder, supra note 60, at 35.
236. See R. BRENNEMAN, supra note 2, at 20-25; Cunningham, supra note 2, at 180 ("[S]ince
American courts have uniformly recognized legal easements in gross, there is reason to suppose that
equitable servitudes in gross will also be recognized. ) (emphasis in original); Netherton, supra
note 6, at 545-50.
237. See Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 164 Conn. 337, 341, 321
A.2d 469, 471 (1973) (treating covenant as easement); Gilbert v. Repertory, Inc., 302 Mass. 105,
107, 18 N.E.2d 437, 438 (1939) (viewing a setback covenant to grant "a right in the general nature of
an easement"); Porter v. Johnson, 232 Mo. App. 1150, 1154, 115 S.W.2d 529, 531 (1938) (deeming a
use restriction to create an "easement enforceable in equity"); Evangelical Lutheran Church of the
Ascension v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 169, 172 N.E. 455, 458 (1930) (asserting covenants are "rights
analogous to easements").
238. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-101 (1973); UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, 12
U.L.A. 51, 52 (Supp. 1984); W. WHYTE, supra note 2, at 7-9.
239. See Upper Eagle Valley Sanitation Dist. v. Carnie, 634 P.2d 1008, 1008 (Colo. Ct. App.
1981).
240. See Farrell v. Hodges Stock Yards, 343 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (La. 1977).
241. See Kleinheider v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 528 F.2d 837, 838-39 (8th Cir. 1975).
242. See City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co., 17 Cal. 2d 576, 581, 110
P.2d 983, 986 (1941).
243. See Boatman v. Lasley, 23 Ohio St. 614, 615 (1873).
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owner's use is controlled to some extent, there is usually no limitation on
the fundamental rights to use of the property.
Another difference is that certain classic easements, such as pipe-
lines and railroads, are so "important" 244 to commercial development
245
that courts must allow the easement holder to assign the benefit. There
is no similar market justification for private conservation servitudes in
gross.
Finally, the classic easement, despite its status as a property inter-
est, 246 is nevertheless subject to the policies of flexibility and limitation of
dead hand control. In Kleinheider v. Phillips Pipe Line Co.,247 for exam-
ple, the court dealt with an easement in gross executed by a predecessor
in title of the servient owner. The easement was to be used for subsurface
pipelines. The easement owner had installed two pipelines and sought to
install a third. The court permitted the installation, finding the language
of the agreement indifferent to number.248 Yet, the court noted that the
burden on the servient parcel was a relevant concern and that the ease-
ment owner was not necessarily entitled to install additional pipelines in
the future.249 The court added that the third pipeline was commercially
justified:
This record shows that the 1973 pipeline was necessary to the ac-
complishment of Phillips' business needs. Moreover, there is noth-
ing in this record to show that the exercise of Phillips' rights under
the contracts in installing that pipeline was unreasonable or unduly
burdensome to the rights of appellants to use their property.
250
Classic easement in gross cases, therefore, lend little support to the
claim that private conservation servitudes in gross should be enforced.
(c) Nonreciprocal appurtenant covenants. -Nonreciprocal ap-
purtenant covenants resemble reciprocal subdivision covenants in that
both involve neighbors-and thus have a built-in limit on the veto power
of a single person-and both allow the flexibility of neighbor relation-
ships. Nonreciprocal appurtenant covenants also resemble in gross inter-
ests, however, in that both give the holder a nonreciprocal veto. Given
the ambiguous policy foundation and the varied fact patterns and lan-
guage of nonreciprocal appurtenant covenants, it is not surprising to find
244. C. CLARK, supra note 81, at 81-89.
245. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 489 comments a & b (1944).
246. See id. § 450 comment h.
247. 528 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1975).
248. See id. at 841-42.
249. See id. at 842 n.4.




a wide range of results in the case law.25 1 Consequently, that case law
provides little guidance for policymakers considering private conserva-
tion servitudes in gross.
B. Duration
Conservation servitudes are meant to have a perpetual life. Some
statutes expressly permit252 and may even indicate a presumption of
253
unlimited duration. Proponents argue that perpetuity is necessary to the
conservation goal.254 The Internal Revenue Code creates an additional
incentive by allowing deductions only for conservation servitudes
"granted in perpetuity. '255
Many parties to real covenants, however, cognizant of the threat of
perpetual land ties, stipulate express termination dates.256 The regula-
tions of various federal mortgage insurance agencies also contemplate
covenants of limited life.257 Still, many covenants are drafted without
express termination dates. Questions then arise whether and how courts
should terminate them in light of antirestrictions concerns. There are
two basic responses: courts may imply a time limit, or rely in part on the
unlimited duration to deny enforcement.
251. In Billington v. Rifle, 492 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ), the court
prohibited the running of a nonreciprocal appurtenant covenant barring the servient owner from
drilling an irrigation well on her property. Although the court based its decision on narrow grounds,
policy concerns about veto power of one owner over the productive use of another's land probably
played a role. Even if the court upheld the covenant because it would allow better exploitation of the
dominant parcel, id at 347, would the court so rule if there were not such a direct benefit to that
dominant land? The answer to that question would tell much about the validity of private conserva-
tion servitudes in gross.
252. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 31 (West Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. § 84.64 (1982);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (1983).
253. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-103(3) (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-4 (1982); IND.
CODE ANN. § 32-5-2.6-2(c) (West Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.40(2)(c) (West Supp. 1983);
see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51081 (West 1983) (ten year maximum, and thereafter until notice of
termination given).
254. In North Dakota v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1095 (1983), the Supreme Court stated:
To ensure that essential habitats will remain protected, the United States has adopted
the practice of acquiring permanent easements whenever possible. . . . The automatic
termination of federal wetlands easements after 99 years would make impossible the
"[c]ertainty and finality" that we have regarded as "critical when ...federal officials
carrying out the mandate of Congress irrevocably commit scarce funds."
Id. at 1106-07 (quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 597 (1972))
(brackets in North Dakota opinion); see R. BRENNEMAN, supra note 2, at 20; A. DUNHAM, supra
note 20, at 5; Netherton, supra note 6, at 542.
255. I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (1982); see Secretary of the Treasury, Proposed Regulation 1.170A-
13(a), (b)(3), 48 Fed. Reg. 22,940, 22,942 (1983) (defining "qualified conservation contribution" as
perpetual and allowing perpetual conservation restrictions as qualified real property interests).
256. See Welshire, Inc. v. Harbison, 33 Del. Ch. 199, 91 A.2d 404 (1952) (30 years); Van Sant v.
Rose, 260 Il1. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913) (43 years); Easton v. Careybrook Co., 210 Md. 286, 123 A.2d
342 (1956) (8 year initial term, then continues until modification by vote of majority of owners).
257. See Siegan, supra note 70, at 81.
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If the court implies a "reasonable" duration for the covenant, 258 it
then must determine what is reasonable under the circumstances. This
question is usually answered by looking to the purpose of the covenant
and to whether that purpose can still be accomplished; 259 this is basically
the changed conditions doctrine. 260 Policy considerations enter only to
the extent that the changed conditions theory incorporates a concern for
obsolete restraints on land. The changed conditions doctrine, however, is
unlikely to curtail conservation servitudes. Conservation servitudes as-
sume that open-space land is valuable simply because it is undeveloped,
especially if it contrasts with surrounding land. Thus, if the neighboring
area becomes developed (a "changed condition"), the conservation servi-
tude's purpose is even better served than before. The "reasonable" dura-
tion approach is, therefore, an inadequate response to perpetual
conservation servitudes.
Other courts treat unlimited life of a covenant as a factor in denying
enforcement, together with concerns about restraint of trade,261 affirma-
tive covenants, 262 or direct restraints on alienation. 263 Although these
latter concerns do not arise in conservation servitudes, the sensitivity to
creating "an onerous burden in perpetuity" 264 should be respected.265
C. Articulation of Public Policy
A few real covenant cases turn on articulated public policy con-
cerns.266 One such case is Amana Society v. Colony Inn, Inc.267
Although other grounds also figure in the decision, the discussion of pub-
258. See Cruciano v. Ceccarone, 36 Del. Ch. 485, 489-90, 133 A.2d 911, 914 (1957); Acopian v.
Haley, 387 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Norris v. Williams, 189 Md. 73, 76-77, 54
A.2d 331, 333 (1947); Duncan v. Academy of the Sisters of the Sacred Heart, 350 S.W.2d 814, 819-
20 (Mo. 1961). Some jurisdictions have passed statutes creating limitations on the permissible dura-
tion of real covenants. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 780 (West Supp. 1983); see also GA.
CODE § 44-5-60(b), (c) (1982) (does not apply to privately held appurtenant covenant servitudes).
259. See Barton v. Moline Properties, Inc., 121 Fla. 683, 694, 164 So. 551, 556 (1935) (denying
enforcement of the covenant); Acopian v. Haley, 387 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(permitting enforcement).
260. See infra subpart V(A)(1).
261. See Hall v. American Oil Co., 504 S.W.2d 313, 316-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
262. See Eagle Enters. v. Gross, 39 N.Y.2d 505, 349 N.E.2d 816, 384 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1976).
263. See Mountain Springs Ass'n v. Wilson, 81 N.J. Super. 564, 196 A.2d 270 (Ch. Div. 1963).
264. Eagle Enters. v. Gross, 39 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 349 N.E.2d 816, 820, 384 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720
(1976) (quoting Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 240, 246, 164 N.E.2d 832, 835,
196 N.Y.S.2d 945, 950 (1959)).
265. There are some indications that courts may closely scrutinize a real covenant that provides
for a broad geographical coverage. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 539 comment f (1944);
supra note 120. A few cases dealing with anticompetitive covenants have expressly required a rea-
sonable territory as a prerequisite to enforcement. See Knight v. Hamilton, 313 Ky. 858, 233
S.W.2d 969 (1950); Webster v. Star Distrib. Co., 241 Ga. 270, 244 S.E.2d 826 (1978).
266. See Welsch v. Goswick, 130 Cal. App. 3d 398, 181 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1982); Beverly Island




lic policy-which is relevant to privately held conservation servitudes in
gross-deserves attention.
A nonprofit religious group founded in Germany in 1714, the
Amana Society came to Iowa in the 1850s, acquired land that became
known as the Colonies or Villages, and began operation as "a true com-
munistic society. ' 268 In 1932 economic pressures forced a reorganiza-
tion. Secular assets were transferred to a profit-making corporation, the
Amana Society, which in six hundred separate conveyances immediately
deeded assets to the original Society's members as private owners. These
deeds contained a form restrictive covenant prohibiting the owner from
operating or maintaining a business, trade, or occupation on the property
without prior written consent of the Society. For forty years such busi-
ness permits were routinely granted. In the 1970s, however, the number
of tourist-oriented businesses greatly increased, and the Society's direc-
tors in effect banned new tourist-oriented businesses. At the time of the
litigation, the Society owned 26,000 acres of land, as well as manufactur-
ing, merchandising, and service enterprises. The Society itself was in-
volved in tourist-oriented businesses and admitted that the restrictions
were meant to limit competition. The Society sued to enjoin violations of
use restrictions in the original deeds. The court held that the action was
barred under the Iowa Stale Use Statute269 because the Society failed to
refile its restriction within the twenty-one year statutory period.
In its opinion, the court addressed significant policy issues, includ-
ing a mistrust of private vetoes over the land of others. The court recog-
nized "the vast potential of the Society's power over land use control: It
may discriminate in the issuance of business permits and may arbitrarily
refuse their issuance. ' 270 Although the benefits were appurtenant and
were intended to benefit the community, the court rejected the Society's
claim as fostering "instability" and "unfairness.
' 271
The Society argued that the unique physical and social character of
the Colonies was a priceless asset, preservable only by the restrictions
because there was no applicable zoning.272 The court noted the historical,
cultural, and architectural value of the Colonies, but rejected the Soci-
ety's argument that no alternative for control existed, citing an Iowa stat-
Long Island County Servs. Group, 92 A.D.2d 119, 460 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 154,
460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1984).
267. 315 N.W.2d 101 (Iowa 1982).
268. Id. at 105.
269. IOWA CODE § 614.24 (1977).
270. 315 N.W.2d at 107.
271. Id. at 117.
272. See id. at 118.
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ute273 protecting areas of historical significance through the creation of
districts not exceeding one-hundred-sixty acres in size:
The purpose of the 160-acre limitation was said to be to allow each
of the colonies to decide for itself whether to become a district.
Control of future development would be the responsibility of com-
missions in each district, rather than the Society, and the member-
ship of the commissions would be elected by the residents of the
districts, in contrast to the present system, in which only Society
members elect its directors. (Less than one-third of the present res-
idents of the colonies are members of the Society.)
27 4
As applied to conservation servitudes, Amana suggests that the
means chosen to preserve the status quo must accommodate other val-
ues, especially democratic concerns.2 75 Amana also demonstrates that
difficult land use decisions are best made by examining the relevant pol-
icy concerns.276 To be sure, the Amana opinion rests on the narrow
ground of the Stale Use Statute, but the court had to specifically reject
the Society's narrow construction of the statute in reaching its deci-
sion. 277 Presumably, policy concerns informed the court's expansive
reading of the legislation.
278
V. Current Techniques for Termination of Servitudes
A. Termination Doctrines
Doctrines for termination of servitudes fall into two groups. The
first includes those triggered by the action or inaction of the servitude
owner. The doctrines of abandonment, 279 estoppel,280 and release 81 are
273. See id at 119 (citing IOWA CODE § 303.20-.24 (1977)).
274. Id.
275. The Amana court voided the covenant despite the religious nature of the societies. See
Taormina Theosophical Community, Inc. v. Silver, 140 Cal. App. 3d 964, 190 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1983)
(voiding a restraint on alienation limited to a specific spiritual society, although the restrictions were
related to religious beliefs).
276. For other courts expressly relying on public policy, see Welsch v. Goswick, 130 Cal. App.
3d 398, 181 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1982) (group home for handicapped, retarded, and elderly); Crane Neck
Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 92 A.D.2d 119, 123-30, 460 N.Y.S.2d
69, 72-76 (1983) (relying upon public policy favoring community group residences for the mentally
disabled), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1984).
277. See 315 N.W.2d at 109-10, 113-16.
278. See generally Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE
L.J. 333, 355-58 (1976) (discussing the role of public policy in statutory interpretation).
279. See Sobolewski v. Brown, 405 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (real covenants); Rossi
v. Sierchio, 30 N.J. Super. 575, 578-80, 105 A.2d 687, 689-90 (App. Div. 1954) (easements); Brady v.
Yodanza, 493 Pa. 186, 189-90 n.2, 425 A.2d 726, 727 n.2 (1981) (easements); Cowling v. Colligan,
158 Tex. 458, 461-62, 312 S.W.2d 943, 945 (1958) (real covenants); Scott v. Rheudasil, 614 S.W.2d
626, 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (real covenants); RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY § 504 (1944) (easements); id. § 558 (real covenants).
280. See Meierhenry v. Smith, 208 Neb. 88, 88-89, 302 N.W.2d 365, 366 (1981) (restrictive




in this category. Because the problem with a private conservation servi-
tude in gross is the servitude owner's assertion of a veto over the servient
owner's preferences, these doctrines are not relevant here.282 The second
group includes those termination doctrines triggered by something other
than action or inaction by the servitude owner, such as changed condi-
tions or relative hardship. The crucial question is whether these doc-
trines can solve problems generated by conservation servitudes.
283
The black letter law provides that the doctrines of changed condi-
tions and relative hardship apply to real covenants, but not to ease-
ments.284 It appears, therefore, that a court could determine the
outcome of a case simply by choosing to categorize a servitude as an
"easement" rather than as a "covenant." Close examination of the rele-
vant law, however, reveals that the changed conditions and relative hard-
ship doctrines actually do apply to easements. Under a theory analogous
to the changed conditions rule, an easement can be extinguished if its
purpose becomes impossible to accomplish or if its intent is no longer
served.285 Moreover, there is case law applying the relative hardship
doctrine to easements. 286 In fact, Professor Unel Reichman has argued
that the rule of relative hardship controls easements as a part of general
tort principles governing property rights.287 Finally, even though deci-
sion by categorization should be rejected in favor of developing termina-
ments); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 559 (1944) (real covenants); see also Valhouli v. Coulouras,
101 N.H. 320, 322, 142 A.2d 711, 712 (1958) (laches); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 562 (1944)
(laches).
281. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 501 (1944) (easements); id § 556 (real covenants).
282. A private association's failure to enforce a conservation restriction that benefits the public is
disturbing, especially because public benefit justifies private ownership of such interests. See Conser-
vation Rights in Real Property Act § 4, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 404 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); S.
REP. No. 1007, supra note 2, at 10-11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6746.
Governmental entities could be pushed by the political process to enforce their servitudes. For de-
tails of the government's enforcement record, see PRIVATE LANDS, supra note 2, at 23, 26-27; Scenic
Easements, supra note 27, at 3, 8; Cunningham, supra note 2, at 182-83; Higgins, supra note 2.
There is no indication of an insurmountable difficulty with governmental enforcement.
283. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT AcT § 3 comment, 12 U.L.A. 51, 55-56 (Supp.
1984) (suggesting that the cy pres doctrine may be applicable to conservation servitudes). Some
authorities, however, have rejected the applicability of this doctrine to real covenants, see, eg., Lake
Wauwanoka, Inc. v. Spain, 622 S.W.2d 309 (Mo. Ct App. 1981), and easements, see, e.g., R. BREN-
NEMAN, supra note 2, at 20.
284. See Rossi v. Sierchio, 30 N.J. Super. 575, 582, 105 A.2d 687, 691 (App. Div. 1954) (hard-
ship); Board of Educ. v. French, 8 Misc. 2d 208, 210, 166 N.Y.S.2d 181, 184 (Sup. Ct. 1957)
(changed conditions); First Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank v. Raphael, 201 Va. 718, 723, 113 S.E.2d 683,
687 (1960) (changed conditions).
285. See A. DUNHAM, supra note 20, at 20; 3 R. POWELL, supra note 10, 422; Cunningham,
supra note 2, at 263; Reichman, supra note 65, at 1258-59.
286. See Bayless Inv. & Trading Co. v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 26 Ariz. App. 265, 271
n.6, 547 P.2d 1065, 1071 n.6 (1976); Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties, Inc., 47 N.J. Super. 26, 35, 135
A.2d 204, 209 (App. Div. 1957).
287. Reichman, supra note 65, at 1255-56.
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tion and modification doctrines based on policy concerns, it is likely that
courts will treat conservation servitudes as covenants288 and thus apply
the changed conditions and relative hardship rules.
1. The Changed Conditions Doctrine.
(a) Statement of the theory.-Courts have declared that spe-
cific enforcement of a real covenant is not available "if conditions have so
changed since the making of the promise as to make it impossible to
secure in a substantial degree the benefits intended to be secured by the
promise. ' 28 9 A few cases indicate that the changed conditions doctrine
bars only equitable relief and that a right to damages remains.290 This
position has been criticized, 291 however, and some courts also have de-
nied damages under the changed conditions theory. 292 Indeed, if condi-
tions have changed so that enforcement of the covenant yields little or no
benefit to the covenantee, then damages will be slight in any case.
Few courts have offered an explanation for the changed conditions
rule;293 of those that have offered a rationale for the doctrine, most have
stated it in contract terms, finding either that the contractual obligation
is discharged by frustration of contractual purpose 94 or by implication
that the parties intended the covenant to last only as long as its purpose
could be achieved.295 Recent commentators explain the doctrine as "as-
suring that the permanency of servitudes does not prevent economic pro-
ductivity of land"296 and as preventing the use of an obsolete servitude to
288. See supra note 9.
289. This test is proposed in the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 564 (1944). For courts apply-
ing this test, see Owens v. Camfield, 614 S.W.2d 698 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981); Lake Wauwanoka, Inc.
v. Spain, 622 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Rick v. West, 34 Misc. 2d 1002, 1006, 228
N.Y.S.2d 195, 199 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Cowling v. Colligan, 158 Tex. 458, 461-62, 312 S.W.2d 943, 945
(1958).
290. See Lake Wauwanoka, Inc. v. Spain, 622 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Welitoffv.
Kohl, 105 N.J. Eq. 181, 186, 147 A. 390, 392 (1929); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 564 comment
d (1944).
291. See C. CLARK, supra note 81, at 185-86; Browder, supra note 60, at 38; French, supra note
68, at 1276.
292. See Barton v. Moline Properties, Inc., 121 Fla. 683, 692, 164 So. 551, 555 (1935); Osius v.
Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 563-64, 147 So. 862, 865 (1933).
293. Some courts attempt to explain the rule merely by restating it. See, eg., Lake Wauwanoka,
Inc. v. Spain, 622 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) ("This refusal [to enforce the covenant] is
because the changed conditions forbid equitable intervention.")
294. See Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 569-70, 147 So. 862, 867 (1933). But see Lake Wauwa-
noka, Inc. v. Spain, 622 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
295. See Barton v. Moline Properties, Inc., 121 Fla. 683, 694, 164 So. 551, 556 (1935).
296. French, supra note 68, at 1300; see Berger, supra note 68, at 1331; Reichman, supra note 65,
at 1258-59. The changed conditions doctrine has been criticized by Ellickson, supra note 68, at 716-




exact a heavy extinguishment fee. 297
(b) Applicability to private conservation servitudes in gross.-
Two questions arise with respect to the changed conditions rule and pri-
vately held conservation servitudes in gross. First, does the changed con-
ditions rule ever apply to conservation servitudes? The answer is that it
does,298 which has troubled some proponents of conservation servitudes,
who have sought to avoid the rule's effect.299 Second, does the changed
conditions doctrine allow courts to police and terminate privately held
conservation servitudes in gross in light of the policy concerns raised in
this Article? The answer to this question, which apparently has not been
discussed before, 3°° is that it does not.
There are several reasons why the changed conditions rule is inade-
quate to regulate conservation servitudes. First, by its own terms, the
rule apparently would not apply to many privately held conservation ser-
vitudes in gross. The assumption underlying many conservation servi-
tudes is that open-space land is beneficial in its own right.30 1 If the realty
surrounding the servient parcel becomes developed, the servitude's pur-
pose will be even better served. In such cases, the changed conditions
doctrine is inapplicable. 30 2 Further, even if the surrounding noise and
pollution harm the flora, wildlife, and topography of the parcel, it is diffi-
cult to say in most cases that it is "impossible to secure to a substantial
degree the benefits" 30 3 of the covenant. As one court said, "[A]n island
297. See Reichman, supra note 65, at 1258. But see Berger, supra note 68, at 1330; Rose, supra
note 68, at 1412-13.
298. See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 263 (erection of billboards on nonrestricted land blocking
view of land subject to scenic easement); Netherton, supra note 6, at 559 (private association owning
conservation servitude ceases to operate).
299. See A. DUNHAM, supra note 20, at 18-19; Netherton, supra note 6, at 559; Maryland Envi-
ronmental Trust, supra note 2, at 10. Some statutes provide for automatic vesting of a private con-
servation servitude in government if the private group ceases to exist. See, eg., MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. § 2-118 (1981); MINN. STAT. § 84.65(3) (1982).
300. See generally UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3 comment, 12 U.L.A. 51, 55
(Supp. 1984) (indicating that changed conditions doctrine can be applied to conservation servitudes).
Some statutes, however, expressly prohibit application of changed conditions, see, ag., TENN. CODE
ANN. § 66-9-306 (1982), or any other common law rule, see, eg., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 247(4)
(McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0305(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-
1985), to terminate a conservation servitude. Analysis of conservation servitudes in gross under
changed conditions doctrine is different from the usual appurtenant convenant cases because the
benefit is evaluated in terms of public benefit, not benefit to a particular dominant parcel.
301. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing value of open space).
302. See Sandstrom v. Larsen, 59 Hawaii 491, 498, 583 P.2d 971, 977 (1978). Sandstrom in-
volved an action to enforce a height limitation by one owner in a residential subdivision against
another. Defendants sought to avoid an injunction on the theory of changed conditions, pointing to
the construction of a thirteen-story condominium near the subdivision, which resulted in partial
obstruction of the view from the subdivision. The court rejected this argument, noting that the
presence of the condominium made preservation of the neighborhood even more important. Id.
303. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 564 (1944).
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is not made a swamp simply because waves lick at its shores. '' 3°4 Finally,
the changed conditions theory simply does not apply if no change in cir-
cumstances occurs, even if relaxation of the servitude is warranted for
reasons of dead hand control, flexibility, or democracy.
2. The Relative Hardship Doctrine.
(a) The scope of the rule.-Some courts construe the relative
hardship doctrine broadly and others narrowly. 30 5 The Restatement of
Property contemplates a broad interpretation: an injunction should not be
granted for violation of a real covenant "if the harm done by granting
will be disproportionate to the benefits secured thereby. ' '30 6 Under this
standard courts have denied an injunction merely if the hardship of the
injunction is disproportionate to its benefit.307 In contrast, other courts
have declared that they will not simply balance the equities,30 8 but will
deny an injunction only if there is "gross" or "great" disproportion be-
tween the benefit and the harm, or a "shocking" hardship.
30 9
Courts differ over other facets of the relative hardship doctrine as
well. Some courts focus on easing the burden on the servient owner,
while others strive to protect the dominant owner's property right.
310
The necessity of demonstrating injury to obtain an injunction splits the
courts further.31' Finally, some courts focus on the moral blameworthi-
ness of the parties, refusing to apply the relative hardship doctrine unless
304. Hawthorne v. Realty Syndicate, Inc., 300 N.C. 660, 667, 268 S.E.2d 494, 499 (1980).
305. See Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties, Inc., 47 N.J. Super. 26, 31-32, 135 A.2d 204, 207 (App.
Div. 1957) (indicating that there is confusion over the availability of the relative hardship doctrine
even within the same jurisdiction); Loeb v. Watkins, 428 Pa. 480, 240 A.2d 513 (1968) (showing a
court divided over relative hardship doctrine); see also French, supra note 68, at 1280 (arguing that
the relative hardship rule is a reformulation of the "changed conditions" doctrine).
306. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 563 (1944).
307. See Valhouli v. Coulouras, 101 N.H. 320, 321-23, 142 A.2d 711, 713 (1958); Holmes Har-
bor Water Co. v. Page, 8 Wash. App. 600, 603-04, 508 P.2d 628, 631 (1973).
308. See. Decker v. Hendricks, 97 Ariz. 36, 41-42, 396 P.2d 609, 612 (1964) (rejecting Restate-
ment test); Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 167-69, 172
N.E. 455, 457 (1930).
309. See Bauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 115, 139 A. 508, 510 (1927); Union County Indus.
Park v. Union County Park Comm'n, 95 N.J. Super. 448, 454, 231 A.2d 812, 815 (App. Div. 1967);
Gaskin v. Harris, 82 N.M. 336, 338, 481 P.2d 698, 700 (1971); New Jerusalem Baptist Church, Inc.
v. City of Houston, 598 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
310. Compare Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 168, 172
N.E. 455, 457 (1930) ("His neighbors are willing to modify the restriction . . . . He refuses to go
with them . . . . The choice is for him only."), with Holmes Harbor Water Co. v. Page, 8 Wash.
App. 600, 606, 508 P.2d 628, 632 (1973) ("The [servient] landowner acted innocently. . . his viola-
tion . . . was unintentional.").
311. Compare Wier v. Isenberg, 95 Ill. App. 3d 839, 845, 420 N.E.2d 790, 795 (1981) (plaintiffs
not required to show injury to prove breach of covenant), with Easton v. Careybrook Co., 210 Md.
280, 291-92, 123 A.2d 342, 345 (1956) (damage required for injunctive relief).
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the servient owner has acted innocently312 or the dominant owner inequi-
tably,31 3 while other courts disregard the moral question.
314
The confusion this mixed bag of opinions creates increases if the
actual decisions are compared with the articulated rationales. A court
may phrase the rule broadly, but decide the case on grounds that fit the
narrow view,315 or state the rule narrowly, but rely on factors that do not
constitute gross disproportion between the harm and the benefit.316 A
court may deny an injunction asking for costly removal of a structure
violating a restriction when even narrow construction of the rule would
require it.317 Finally, as Powell notes, courts typically do not rely exclu-
sively on the relative hardship doctrine; usually other factors, such as
acquiescence or changed conditions, also are involved.
3 18
Such confusion is not surprising. The relative hardship rule is sub-
ject to the general fluidity of all equitable doctrines.319 The conflict be-
tween freedom of contract and the antirestrictions policy destabilizes
matters further. Although that conflict is seldom discussed, some courts
do consider related values in relative hardship cases. Thus, courts have
noted that a covenant is a moral obligation,3 20 that the economic ex-
312. Bauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 116, 139 A. 508, 510-11 (1927); Ortega Co. v. Justiss, 175
So. 2d 554, 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., 244 N.Y. 22, 31, 154
N.E. 652, 654 (1926).
313. Welshire, Inc. v. Harbison, 33 Del. Ch. 199, 206-07, 91 A.2d 404, 408 (1952); Kiernan v.
Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
314. See Valhouli v. Coulouras, 101 N.H. 320, 142 A.2d 711 (1938).
315. See Holmes Harbor Water Co. v. Page, 8 Wash. App. 600, 603-06, 508 P.2d 628, 631-32
(1973) (quoting Restatement's broad standard with approval, but denying injunction because "cost
of removing the violation was exorbitant when compared with the slight violation of the covenant").
316. In Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties, Inc., 47 N.J. Super. 26, 135 A.2d 204 (App. Div. 1957),
the court rejected a mere balancing of the equities and required gross disproportion, but concluded
that the damage to plaintiff of $1,000 compared to defendant's damages of $11,500 (plus lost rents)
was "grossly disproportionate." Id. at 35-36, 135 A.2d at 209.
317. See Bauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 139 A. 508 (1927); Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties,
Inc., 47 N.J. Super. 26, 135 A.2d 204 (App. Div. 1957). But see Decker v. Hendricks, 97 Ariz. 36,
396 P.2d 609 (1964). Although such decisions may help prevent forfeiture, it is troubling that these
cases reinforce the actions of one who violates the covenant without ascertaining the servitude
owner's rights, but penalize the person who, to avoid unilaterally prejudicing another's rights, seeks
a declaratory judgment before acting.
318. See Valhouli v. Coulouras, 101 N.H. 320, 323, 142 A.2d 711, 713 (1958); Holmes Harbor
Water Co. v. Page, 8 Wash. App. 600, 605-06, 508 P.2d 628, 632 (1973); 5 R. POWELL, supra note
10, 679[3], at 60-142.
319. This idea is best known from the precept that granting an injunction is within the discretion
of a court of equity. See, e.g., Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties, Inc., 47 N.J. Super. 26, 29-31, 135 A.2d
204, 206 (App. Div. 1957).
320. Decker v. Hendricks, 97 Ariz. 36, 41-42, 396 P.2d 609, 612 (1964) ("perpetrator of a
wrong"); Bauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 115, 139 A. 508, 510 (1927) ("wrongfully in a willful
invasion of another's rights in real property"); Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension v.
Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 166, 172 N.E. 455, 457 (1930) (referring to a "knowing violation . . . the
wrongdoer [and] his victim").
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change between parties should be respected 3 21 that freedom of choice
should be preserved, 322 that contract enforcement promotes social stabil-
ity,323 and that restrictions can hinder reasonable use of land,324 making
it unprofitable for development. 325 To eliminate conflicting and self-con-
tradictory decisions, courts should decide relative hardship cases differ-
ently than they do now, articulating the policy basis for their decisions
rather than applying a wooden rule without explanation.
(b) Applicability to private conservation servitudes in gross.-
There are several reasons why the relative hardship rule is inadequate for
terminating conservation servitudes in gross. The law of relative hard-
ship is murky and difficult for a court to apply, and there is little reason
to think the policy considerations discussed here would be examined.
Moreover, the focus of the relative hardship doctrine on the conflict be-
tween individual landowners is too narrow to encompass the public inter-
est, which must be considered in the case of private conservation
servitudes. 326 The rule does, however, offer a lesson: the servitude
321. Welshire, Inc. v. Harbison, 33 Del. Ch. 199, 206, 91 A.2d 404, 407-08 (1952) (denying
declaratory judgment relaxing restrictions); Lake Wauwanoka, Inc. v. Spain, 622 S.W.2d 309, 314
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (denying claim for reformation); Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascen-
sion v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 166-67, 172 N.E. 455, 457 (1930) (denying enforcement of existing
covenants).
322. See Kiernan v. Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (owners should not be
denied relief merely because realty values were not impaired by the use restrictions); Loeb v. Wat-
kins, 428 Pa. 480, 484, 240 A.2d 513, 516 (1968) (individual's aesthetic values should be protected).
323. See Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties, Inc., 47 N.J. Super. 26, 35, 135 A.2d 204, 209 (App. Div.
1957) ("The [relative hardship] doctrine is, we think, particularly applicable to a case, such as this,
where we are dealing with two commercial properties; personal interests, or the pleasure that may be
secured in the enjoyment of an equitable servitude of a certain type, is in no way involved.").
324. See Easton v. Careybrook Co., 210 Md. 286, 290-91, 123 A.2d 342, 344 (1956) (servient
owner cannot build, but must pay taxes and upkeep); Orange & Rockland Utils. v. Philwold Estates,
52 N.Y.2d 253, 258, 418 N.E.2d 1310, 1315, 437 N.Y.S.2d 291, 296 (1981) (owner must have some
reasonable use of land).
325. See Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., 244 N.Y. 22, 30, 154 N.E. 652, 654 (1926) (stating
that value of property is important because "either it must be utilized for business purposes or it
must remain idle"); Katzman v. Anderson, 359 Pa. 280, 285, 59 A.2d 85, 87 (1948) (stating that
equity will not enforce a restriction that is "unfit or unprofitable for use and development").
326. See Wier v. Isenberg, 95 Ill. App. 3d 839, 842, 420 N.E. 790, 793 (1981) ("While a change
in the character of the surrounding property might preclude injunctive relief, a court does not bal-
ance the equities as it would in an ordinary nuisance case or in a request for rezoning."); Evangelical
Lutheran Church of the Ascension v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 168, 172 N.E. 455, 457 (1930)
("Neither at law nor in equity is it written that a license has been granted to religious corporations,
by reason of the high purpose of their being, to set covenants at naught."); Katzman v. Anderson,
359 Pa. 280, 285, 59 A.2d 85, 87 (1948) ("greater hardship to the servient than a benefit to the
dominant tenement") (emphasis added). But see Blakeley v. Gorin, 365 Mass. 590, 313 N.E.2d 903
(1974) (discussing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 30 (West 1977) (current version at MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §30 (West Supp. 1984)), which allows denial of an injunction to enforce a
real covenant if the public interest requires); Holmes Harbor Water Co. v. Page, 8 Wash. App. 600,
603, 508 P.2d 628, 631 (1973). In tort law, unlike real covenant law, the interest of the public is a
factor in determining the appropriateness of an injunction.
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owner may still recover damages even though injunctive relief is
barred.3 27 Thus, a court not wishing to specifically enforce a private con-
servation servitude in gross could order damages.328 Presumably, the
award could be used to acquire a new conservation servitude not in con-
flict with societal needs.
B. Acquisition and Termination Provisions in Conservation Servitude
Statutes
1. Acquisition of Servitudes.-Of the twenty-six state statutes au-
thorizing private conservation servitudes in gross, 329 only four 330 appear
to require any public participation in the acquisition of such interests.
Two of these, the Montana and Delaware provisions, are inadequate to
resolve the problems raised by private conservation servitudes in gross.
To minimize conflicts in local planning, the Montana legislation subjects
private conservation servitudes to review by the appropriate local plan-
ning authority prior to recording. The statute is triggered by recording
rather than acquisition, however, and expressly provides that the plan-
ning board's comments "will not be binding . . . but shall be merely
advisory in nature. ' 331 The Delaware statute requires the agency or de-
partment "having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the easement" 332
to accept private servitudes pursuant to certain standards, but does not
indicate which agencies or departments have jurisdiction, if any.
The two remaining statutes-California and Massachusetts-ade-
quately provide for public participation in the acquisition of private con-
servation servitudes in gross, 333 requiring approval by the legislature of
the locality in which the land is located and, in Massachusetts, by the
327. See Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties, Inc., 47 N.J. Super. 26, 34-35, 135 A.2d 204, 208-09
(App. Div. 1957); Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., 244 N.Y. 22, 31, 154 N.E. 652, 654 (1926);
Bauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 115, 139 A. 508, 511 (1927); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 563
comment b (1944).
328. Concerning the measure of damages, see Bauby v. Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 116, 139 A. 508,
511 (1927) (damages equal "the depreciation in the value of [the] property caused by the violation of
the restrictive covenant"); infra note 354 (discussing calculation of damages for breach of conserva-
tion servitudes in gross which, by definition, do not involve a dominant tenement).
329. See supra note 17 (citing statutes that allow private conservation servitudes in gross).
330. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51083.5, 51084 (West 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6814 (1983);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-206 (1983).
MINN. STAT. § 84.65(1) (1982) requires that nonprofit charitable corporations and home rule char-
ter or statutory cities file a notice with the department of natural resources within 90 days of acquisi-
tion of a conservation servitude. There is, however, no requirement that the acquisition be approved.
331. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-206 (1983).
332. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6814 (1983).
333. Although these statutes adequately provide for acquisition of private conservation servi-
tudes in gross, they are not similarly successful concerning termination of such interests. See infra
text accompanying note 346.
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executive as well. 334 The California statute requires the governing body
to find by resolution that "the preservation of the land as open space is in
the best interest of the county or city," in light of three specific factors.335
The Massachusetts statute instructs the governmental body to determine
that the conservation restriction is in "the public interest" before approv-
ing the servitude.
336
The failure of virtually all private conservation servitude statutes to
provide for adequate public control over acquisition contrasts with statu-
tory governmental conservation servitudes. The political accountability
of public officials helps ensure that governmental servitudes are in the
public interest, and numerous governmental servitude statutes have ex-
press provisions-setting priorities for conservation servitude acquisi-
tion,337 authorizing state agencies to establish guidelines for servitude
purchases, 338 or requiring public hearings prior to acquisition deci-
sions339-that aid in protecting the public interest. Although the public
interest is no less important with respect to private conservation servi-
tudes, some statutes authorizing both governmental and private conser-
vation servitudes 340 provide for public hearings3 41 or acquisition
regulations 342 for governmental servitudes but not for private conserva-
tion servitudes.
2. Termination of Servitudes.-The statutes authorizing private
conservation servitudes in gross do not provide an adequate means of
terminating such interests when the public interest requires. Only ten of
the twenty-six statutes address the termination issue.343 Eight of these
indicate that termination can be effected under traditional servitude
334. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West Supp. 1984) (approval required by mayor or
city manager and city council, selectmen, or town meeting); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51083.5, 51084
(West 1983) (approval by governing body).
335. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51084 (West 1983). To determine that the open space preservation is
in the best interest of the public in the terms of this statute, the land must have scenic value to the
public or be valuable as a watershed or wildlife preserve, have value as open space because it is near
urban areas or preserves rural character, or must otherwise serve the public interest.
336. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West Supp. 1984).
337. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1409(c), 9-1410 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 65.466 (1980).
338. See, eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1202(e) (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 271.725 (1983);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-15-107 (1982).
339. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 271.735 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11942 (Purdon Supp.
1983); id. tit. 32, §§ 5003, 5006.
340. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1201 to 1206 (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 271.715-.795
(1983).
341. OR. REV. STAT. § 271.735 (1983).
342. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1202(e) (Supp. 1983).
343. Id. § 50-1203(b); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51090-51094 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-
30.5-107 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-4 (1982); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-118(d)
(1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West Supp. 1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:46




law,344 which is inadequate for responding to the public policy con-
cerns.345 The other two-Massachusetts and California--offer more lib-
eral termination rules than traditional servitude law allows.34 6 Even
these provisions are inadequate, however, because they are concerned
mostly with limiting a private association's authority to release the re-
striction; the statutes provide no method to terminate a servitude that the
private association seeks to continue.
Governmental conservation servitudes are more adequately treated.
Some statutes allow release "if the public interest would be better served
by the cancellation of the easement, ' 347 if "change of circumstances shall
render such easement no longer beneficial to the public, ' 348 or if essential
to orderly growth and development.3 49 Moreover, a few provisions re-
quire public hearings before termination of governmental conservation
servitudes.350
VI. A Proposal of Alternative Solutions
There is more than one way to solve the problems presented by the
§ 34-39-5 (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.40(3)(b) (West Supp. 1984-1985); see UNIF. CON-
SERVATION EASEMENT AcT § 3(b), 12 U.L.A. 51, 55 (Supp. 1984).
344. For statutes indicating that termination of private conservation servitudes in gross should
be in the manner in which easements generally are terminated, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-107
(1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-4 (1982); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-118(d) (1981); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:46 (1983). For statutes indicating that termination should be in accordance
with principles of law and equity, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1203(b) (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 700.40(3)(b) (West Supp. 1984); UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT AT § 3(b), 12 U.L.A.
51, 55 (Supp. 1984). Rhode Island provides for termination of restrictions in accordance with appli-
cable statutes and regulations. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-39-5 (Supp. 1983). Finally, N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW § 49-0307(l)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985), indicates that termination for pri-
vate servitudes is to be pursuant to N.Y. REAL PROP. ACrs. § 1951 (McKinney 1983), the state's
termination procedure for general servitudes. Additional termination procedures for conservation
servitudes may be sought in New York. See McFadden, Cab and Land Measures Required 6 Months
Talks, Cuomo Aide Says, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1984, at B2, col. 5.
345. See supra subpart V(A).
346. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51093 (West 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West
Supp. 1984); see McFadden, supra note 344 (discussing proposed changes in New York).
347. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-15-108(2) (1982). This statute includes other conditions, such as a
requirement that the easement has been in effect for at least 10 years. Id. For similar statutes, see
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1202(e) (Supp. 1983); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51093 (West 1983); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West Supp. 1984).
348. IOWA CODE § 11 D.2 (1984) (rejects "comparative economic test"); see WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.34(3m) (West Supp. 1984); cf. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0307(3)(d) (McKinney Supp.
1984-1985) (allowing public notice, a hearing, evidence that the easement can no longer serve a
conservation purpose, and legislative approval to extinguish perpetual duration easements held by
the state in the Adirondack and Catskill parks).
349. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5010 (Purdon Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 10-153 (1978); see ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 9-1413 (1976); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0307(3)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1984-
1985) (providing for release for necessary major transmission facilities if public interest in conserva-
tion has been considered).




private conservation servitude owner's veto power over the servient
owner's land use decisions. Legislatures and courts can choose from sev-
eral alternatives based upon various factors, including the balance each
approach strikes among the competing policies of conservation, freedom
of contract, and limiting dead hand control. Generally, a legislative re-
sponse seems preferable to a judicial one.
35 1
A. Legislative Solutions
1. Limitation to Government Ownership.--One solution to the veto
power problem is to permit only the government to hold conservation
servitudes in gross, statutorily prohibiting private ownership. This
would submit the choice between development and preservation to the
democratic process, not private veto. Mandating predecision public
hearings would enhance the process.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it may reduce the amount
of land brought under conservation restrictions. Furthermore, private
action should not be prohibited altogether unless there are no viable al-
ternatives that can limit the dead hand. Thus, this type of legislative
solution is a rough remedy and not an optimal solution.
2. Limited Duration Private Ownership. -Another approach is to
allow ownership of conservation servitudes by nonprofit trusts, associa-
tions, and corporations (in addition to government), but to limit statuto-
rily the servitude's duration. The provision also could permit transfer of
the interest to the government, after which it would become perpetual.
Additionally, the statute could provide that servitudes drafted to last
longer than the statutory maximum would, upon reaching the maximum,
automatically vest in the state. A reasonable maximum for private own-
ership is twenty years; problems of dead hand control become significant
after that. The maximum duration could be as low as one year if the
legislature wishes to allow private interests only as a means to increase
governmental servitudes through voluntary transfer by private groups or
through automatic vesting in government.
Under this approach, society benefits from the special conservation
skills of private associations without undue dead hand control. Termina-
tion would occur automatically; no judicial intervention would be neces-
sary. Thus, a clear framework for negotiation would be established and
claims of uncertainty avoided. Disadvantages include possible abandon-
351. If a legislative scheme is adopted, the statute should expressly include all private conserva-





ment of conservation efforts by those who believe that only perpetual ties
are adequate, the disincentive of compulsion (although some private as-
sociations have voluntarily assigned their interests to the government),
the automatic termination of conservation servitudes that still serve the
public interest, the possible loss of federal tax deductions because conser-
vation servitudes could no longer be created "in perpetuity" as the Inter-
nal Revenue Code requires,352 and potential confusion over land titles.
3. Termination Based on the Public Interest. -Another solution is
to allow both government and nonprofit groups to own conservation ser-
vitudes in gross, but to deny equitable enforcement of private interests
when an injuction is not "in the public interest, '353 allowing damages as
the only remedy. 354 Such a statute could allow local and state govern-
ments to intervene in actions seeking specific enforcement of a private
conservation servitude in gross, providing greater representation of the
public voice. 355 Moreover, the legislation could require government ap-
proval before a private conservation servitude in gross could be created.
This approach provides a mechanism for terminating private vetoes
without disrespect for private property rights and conservation values.
The benefits of private endeavors are retained. Although some land may
be withdrawn from preserved status under the public interest standard,
there need be no great disincentive to private action: the standard could
be made rigorous, and the compensatory damages would allow acquisi-
tion of new conservation servitudes. To be sure, the public interest stan-
dard is not capable of precise definition. The policy concerns are clear,
however, and attention to them would ensure no less predictability and
judicial economy than is found in other common-law decisionmaking.
This solution can be easily added to existing state legislation authorizing
private conservation servitudes and to the Uniform Conservation Ease-
ment Act.
352. I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) (1982).
353. Cf IOWA CODE § 11 1D.2 (1984) (discussed supra note 348 and accompanying text); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (West Supp. 1984) (discussed supra notes 334, 336, and accompany-
ing text).
354. Calculation of the damages for breach of a real covenant in gross cannot be based on the
loss suffered by the dominant parcel because there is no dominant parcel with respect to in gross
interests. A court could base damages on the difference between the market value of the burdened
parcel with the servitude and the market value of the burdened parcel without the servitude. See
Secretary of the Treasury, Proposed Regulation 1.170, 48 Fed. Reg. 22,940, 22,947 (1983).





1. Prohibition of Private in Gross Interests. -The simple judicial so-
lution to the servitude owner's veto power is to refuse to allow the bur-
den of a private conservation servitude in gross to run.356 This approach
limits the duration of private veto power, because only the original con-
venantor is bound. Moreover, a flat refusal by the courts would force
proponents of such interests before the legislature to seek a comprehen-
sive solution.
Despite its attractive simplicity, this approach is probably too dras-
tic. Private conservation efforts again would be frustrated. It seems
preferable to legitimate private conservation servitudes in gross while
controlling the harmful effects that they can generate. In addition, gov-
ernmental conservation servitudes in gross would have to be carefully
exempted from the rule. Finally, this flat prohibition would not be ade-
quate to meet all dead hand control concerns: it is possible that even
against the original covenantor, the public interest would be so great as
to jusify denial of enforcement.
2. A Public Interest Test.-Even without express statutory guide-
lines, courts could apply a public interest standard in cases of both com-
mon-law357 and statutory private conservation servitudes in gross. This
position finds support in the traditional view that real covenants violat-
ing public policy cannot be enforced. 358 The public interest component
of the law of nuisance359 and the rules relating to easements for public
utilities360 provide useful analogies in developing this standard. Such an
approach has the flexibility of the legislative public interest standard.
VII. Conclusion
Private conservation servitudes in gross appropriately foster conser-
vation and private initiative, but they also can contravene the public pol-
icy and judicial precedent of limiting dead hand ties on land and
encouraging flexibility and democracy in land use controls. This Article
356. There is precedent for this solution. See supra subpart IV(A)(2)(b)(i).
357. See supra note 20.
358. See supra note 61.
359. Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933); Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 227-28, 257 N.E.2d 870, 874-75, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 318-19 (1970);
Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37, 40-43, 258 N.Y.S. 229, 233-35 (1932); RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 941 (1977).
360. Consumers Power Co. v. Costle, 468 F. Supp. 375, 379 (E.D. Mich. 1979) ("The easements
granted to utilities are in trust for the public and not a grant of right to private individuals.").
Similarly, it can be argued that private conservation servitudes in gross are held in trust for the




has proposed several means of alleviating this tension without aban-
doning the goals of conservationists or compromising long-standing pol-
icy. It remains for legislatures and courts to implement solutions that
properly balance the competing values.
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